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INTRODUCTION 
What are the facts? Again and again and again – what are 
the facts? Shun wishful thinking, ignore divine revelation, 
forget what “the stars foretell,” avoid opinion, care not 
what the neighbors think, never mind the unguessable 
“verdict of history” – what are the facts, and to how many 
decimal places? You pilot always into an unknown future; 
facts are your single clue. Get the facts! 
Robert A. Heinlein 
 
There are peculiarities about science fiction and its study that can only be described 
as, to use a slightly modified phrase by William Gibson, paradoxical antagonisms. 
On the one hand, science fiction is overtly concerned with explorative encounters 
with radical novelty and yet, on the other hand, much of its poetics and thematic 
focus is surprisingly repetitive and formulaic. The repetitiveness does not seem, 
however, to affect science fiction’s popularity nor its entertainment or artistic value. 
To the contrary, many works of science fiction continue to be among the most 
popular, relevant and most critically acclaimed books or films of all time. 
 A paradox of a different type concerns the academic study of science fiction. 
While it has a fairly long and a certainly rich history, there seem to be interesting 
gaps in it. In very rough terms, science fiction studies fall into two categories: the 
theoretical and the practical. The theoretical works are more focused on the formal 
aspects of science fiction (what makes science fiction science fiction) and thus its 
position vis-à-vis other types or genres of literature. The practical criticism of science 
fiction is, in turn, more interested in specific themes, problems or even particular 
authors and thus the relations between science fictional texts and broader cultural, 
social or political contexts.  
 These two general categories of science fiction studies are indicative of a 
certain general characteristic of literary theory. The theoretical analyses all operate in 
the realm of specialized academic discourse of literary studies which, even though a 
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constituent part of the humanities, leaves very little space to account for the presence 
of the human agency of both the authors and their audiences in the creation and 
reception of science fiction.  The more practically oriented studies, rather than being 
too far removed from the human factor, are in turn too specific in their piecemeal 
approach of analyzing given texts, or sets of texts, from particular analytical 
perspectives.  
The result is a constellation of, oftentimes brilliant, critical texts which, in its 
totality, lacks an integrating element, or an overarching meta-theory that would allow 
for relating the results of critical or interpretative explorations to one another. 
Because of that, even though both categories include analyses from an extremely 
large variety of perspectives, it is somewhat puzzling to note that there seem to be a 
number of elephant-in-the-room type of questions concerning science fiction that are 
seldom, if ever, asked, much less answered (and even if, then in terms far too general 
to be considered satisfactory): if radical novelty (Todorov’s “scientific marvelous” or 
Suvin’s “novum”) is the central formal feature of science fiction, how is that novelty 
(otherness or alienness) realized? What mechanisms govern the creation of novelty 
and what makes formulaic encounters with it not only entertaining but intellectually 
stimulating and culturally relevant? How does science fiction elicit a continuous 
interest in itself despite its formulaicness? What are the narrative patterns and what is 
their function? And, perhaps most importantly: what is science fiction even for? It is 
the aim of this thesis to answer these fundamental questions by introducing a meta-
theory of science fiction derived from the insights of Darwinian Literary Studies. 
 There is a noticeable tendency to regard Darwinian Literary Studies as both a 
marginal and an unwanted area of literary theory. A bastard child of natural sciences 
and anti-postructuralist positions within Theory, this relatively recent approach to the 
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study of literature distances itself from what it considers the dominant theoretical 
paradigms and is an attempt to explain the functions and the forms of literature in 
terms consistent with evolutionary psychology, and consequently, with the broader 
evolutionary paradigm. This paradigm, as Dominika Oramus argues in her recent 
book Darwinowskie paradygmaty. Mit teorii ewolucji w kulturze współczesnej, is not 
only the de facto organising paradigm for the life sciences, but has also established 
itself as a powerful presence in culture. As Oramus shows, evolutionary theory has 
profoundly influenced and shaped discourse in theology, teleology and metaphysics. 
It has codified the popular image of a scientist and of science itself. It has also 
proved to be a potent source of inspiration for the popular discourse of science 
fiction which insistently turns towards genetics, mutations and reversed, accelerated 
or otherwise alternative evolutions as its thematic focus.1 
 Despite its apparent marginality within literary studies, the influence of 
evolutionary theory on the humanities as a whole, has been significant. The 
publication of Edward O. Wilson’s 1971 Sociobiology, in which the author attempted 
to apply evolutionary criteria to the study of human behaviour sparked a massive 
controversy and a long series of debates and arguments. Ullica Segerstrale’s 
enormous (twenty chapters long) book Defenders of the Truth: The Battle for Science 
in the Sociobiology Debate and Beyond provides a detailed analysis of the 
controversy, the length, intensity and the complexity of which lead the author to treat 
it and to present it as an opera in three acts, complete with the authors invitation to 
the reader to imagine the actual music scores. Dramatic as the sociobiology 
controversy was, in its result “during the last three decades or so the idea of a 
                                                          
1 See: Dominika Oramus, Darwinowskie paradygmaty. Mit teorii ewolucji w kulturze współczesnej 
(Kraków: Copernicus Center Press, 2015) 
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biological foundation for human behaviour has become more acceptable on both 
scientific and intellectual grounds.”2 
The gradual acceptance for the sociobiologist programme constitutes one part 
of developments which lead to the emergence of Darwinian Literary Studies. The 
other element is the growing sense of disappointment with post-structuralist and 
post-modernist conceptions which came to dominate literary theory since at least the 
1970s. The Sokal Affair and the publications of Gross and Levitt’s Higher 
Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science in 1994 and Sokal and 
Bricmont’s Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science in 
1998 made it apparent that there are flaws in both the practice of critical theory and 
its constructivist tenet of the primacy of discourse. 
These two developments opened ground for the emergence of a form of 
literary study which seeks to reconcile itself with the natural sciences under the meta-
narrative conception of scientific consilience, presupposing that biological and 
evolutionary explanations of human behaviour reached by the natural sciences have 
to be applicable in the analysis of cultural phenomena and that, vice versa, the 
conclusions of research conducted within the humanities cannot stand at odds with 
those of the natural sciences. 
Thus, Darwinian Literary Studies turn to evolutionary sciences as a necessary 
intermediary between the human and the natural sciences, in order to derive and form 
principles of literary theory. What DLS entails is the focus on the search for evolved 
psychological mechanisms which influence the structure and content of cultural 
creations and the inquiry into the possible functions of these creations in relation to 
the central evolutionary problems of fitness and adaptiveness. In more practical 
                                                          
2 Ullica Segerstrale, Defenders of the Truth: The Battle for Science in the Sociobiology Debate and 
Beyond(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 308 
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terms, the Darwinian study of literature requires an approach to literary texts from an 
angle different than other forms of literary criticism. It enforces a change of focus, 
from a “what happens” type of approach to “why and how something happens.” In a 
more technical formulation, DLS focuses more on the mechanisms governing the 
process of cultural creation rather than on the actual process itself. Taking this 
character of DLS into account it should become apparent why it is an approach 
particularly suited to answer the questions outlined above and to address the gap in 
science fiction studies which the existence of these questions signifies.  
 The thesis is organised into four chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the increasing 
biological awareness of the present cultural moment manifested in the growing 
scope, effectiveness and even popularity of evolutionary research in a number of 
related disciplines, from palaeontology to genetics. It introduces E.O. Wilson’s idea 
of scientific consilience and provides an overview of some of the most prominent 
evolutionary perspectives on human behaviour in order to provide an outline of the 
evolutionary paradigm which forms the basis of Darwinian Literary Studies.  
 Chapter 2 engages more directly with literary theory. It first considers the 
essentially reactionary character of Darwinian Literary Studies, introduces its major 
conceptual premises and the theoretical framework and scope of the field. The 
chapter then discusses the possibility thatby acquainting the reader with the 
generalised notions of novelty, strangeness and otherness, and by culturally 
perpetuating a set of adaptively motivated responses to these notions, science fiction 
serves an adaptively beneficial, fitness-enhancing role. 
 Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to the analysis of the two crucial elements of the 
poetics of science fiction, exploration and alienness respectively, in relation to its 
potentially adaptive function, discussed in the previous chapter. Chapter 3 focuses on 
6 
 
the narrative pattern of a journey from a highly regulated heterotopic space into the 
unregulated paraspace outside of it and links it with a set of innate tendencies of 
landscape exploration. Chapter 4 considers the role of disgust as a primary means of 
evoking estrangement, and thus, its crucial role in organising the science fictional 
aesthetics. Both chapters foreground the interplay between curiosity and fear implicit 
in the encounter with radical otherness and thus aim to address the paradox of the 
formulaicness of science fictional novelty. 
 Due to the wealth of the material available, the texts, films and video games 
discussed in these chapters are not chosen on the basis of any clearly definable 
criteria other than their popularity and their representativeness of either the genre or 
of the phenomenon which they illustrate. This lack of systematicity in the selection 
of research material, while normally a flaw, is premeditated. Over the course of the 
past decade, I have read over two hundred science fiction novels and short-story 
collections. It would obviously be impractical to include all of them in the discussion 
nor would it be reasonable to provide lists of titles that can be used as supporting 
evidence for the claims made in the thesis. The additional benefit of this somewhat 
random selection of analysed material is that the lack of a pre-defined analytical key 
showcases the predictive character of the claims made in the thesis. 
 The conclusion summarises the analysis and presents a consolidated account 
of the research’s findings. It also addresses the limitations of Darwinian Literary 
Studies and comments upon its value and significance for literary theory. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTO THE FRAY: THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL 
PARADIGM AND SCIENTIFIC CONSILIENCE 
 
Like every other creature on the face of the earth, Godfrey was, by 
birthright, a stupendous badass, albeit in the somewhat narrow 
technical sense that he could trace his ancestry back up a long line 
of slightly less highly evolved stupendous badasses to that first 
self-replicating gizmo – which, given the number and variety of its 
descendants, might justifiably be described as the most stupendous  
badass of all time. Everyone and everything that wasn't a 
stupendous badass was dead. 
Neal Stephenson, Cryptonomicon 
 
When the anthropologist Robert Augner cheerfully announces the coming of an "Age 
of Universal Darwinism"3 or when the philosopher Daniel Dennett speaks of the idea 
of natural selection as a "universal acid"4 biting its way through science and culture 
alike, they are not being merely expressively optimistic in their propagandising. 
Instead, they point to the profundity of the phenomenon of growing biological and 
evolutionary awareness, a broad process of emergence of a series of discoveries and 
consequent paradigmatic shifts proceeding along three different vectors, all sharing 
the same point of origin, yet pointing in different directions: backwards through 
evolutionary biology and evolutionary anthropology, forwards through genetics and 
biotechnology and inwards through sociobiology and evolutionary psychology. This 
chapter provides a brief overview of the three lines of inquiry, focusing on the third 
one, as it constitutes the conceptual basis for the development of Darwinian Literary 
Studies. 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Robert Augner, “Introduction,” in: Darwinizing Culture. The Status of Memetics as a Science 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 1. 
4 Daniel Dennet, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. Evolution and the Meanings of Life (London: Penguin 
Books, 1996), p. 63. 
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The Scope of Darwinist Thought 
 
The backwards, past-oriented research vector, the reconstruction of human 
evolutionary history, is at the same time the oldest, the best established and presently 
appears to be scientifically least controversial of the three. It forms the basis and the 
foundation for the other two, both in terms of scientific and cultural significance. At 
present, the human lineage, from the homo habilis, through homo erectus and on to 
the homo sapiens is obvious, the progression clear and apparent, the fossil record 
forming a more or less continuous picture. Within it there are of course areas of 
uncertainty and discontinuity such as the mystery of the exact relation between the 
homo sapiens and the homo neanderthalis and the ultimate fate of the latter. New 
discoveries are also made, the most recent, and extremely puzzling, being the homo 
florienensis, a pygmy homo subspecies averaging about 1 meter in height. The 
mysteries, however, do not disturb the overall picture of human descent, nor do they 
threaten to uproot the paradigm. Instead, they offer a possibility of creating a fuller 
and more accurate description of human evolutionary history, each discovery filling 
a gap in the network of knowledge. 5 
The second vector of inquiry is future-oriented, and proceeds from the 
advancements made in the fields of molecular biology, genetics, and a host of other 
fields loosely termed “biotechnology,” all developed as a direct consequence of 
probing into  the very mechanisms of heredity, the vehicle for natural selection. 
Here, the progress is also clear: from the discovery of genes, through the description 
of the structure and nature of the DNA and onwards to the complete mapping of 
human and animal genomes. These achievements in turn open a myriad of new 
                                                          
5 For an overview see: Robert Foley, Unknow Boundaries: Exploring Human Evolutionary Studies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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possibilities, opportunities and challenges across the spectrum ranging from 
traditional medicine and pharmacology at the conservative end, through the 
controversial and hotly debated issues of stem cell research and transplantology, all 
the way to the radical propositions of direct interventions into the genome raised by 
the more extremist activists grouped under the moniker of “transhumanists.” 
 The speed at which research along this vector proceeds is staggering and a 
comprehensive description would be both immensely difficult and well beyond the 
scope of the present study. There are, however, two telling examples, testifying to the 
ubiquity and scope of the bio-oriented research. The Folding@home project, led by 
Pande Lab, a part of the Departments of Chemistry and of Structural Biology, 
Stanford University and Stanford University Medical Center researches the process 
of protein folding, that is, the translation of a fragment of genetic code into a self-
assembled functional protein. The goal of the project is to “simulate protein folding 
in order to understand how proteins fold so quickly and reliably, and to learn about 
what happens when this process goes awry (when proteins misfold).”6 Diseases such 
as Alzheimer’s, Huntington’s and the BSE are believed to result from misfolding of 
proteins. The most striking element of the project, however, is its “@home” 
component. The simulation and research are conducted by means of a distributed 
computing network in which thousands of volunteers participate by downloading 
client software which automatically downloads a sample to analyse and returns the 
results to the central server. The client program operates only when the user’s 
computer is not occupied otherwise, thus effectively using the “spare” computing 
power and it used to be available even for the Sony Playstation 3 gaming console. As 
of May 16th 2012 there are 8185045 processors active in the project with the 
                                                          
6 http://folding.stanford.edu/English/Science (16 May, 2012). 
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computing power of over 7000 x86 TFLOPS7 (for comparison: the Cray XT5 Jaguar 
supercomputer operates at the peak of 1750 TFLOPS8). The project has resulted in 
the publication of 96 papers since its start in 2000.9 
A parallel project, Rosetta@home, run by the  Baker Laboratory at the 
University of Washington and based on the popular BOINC client (Berkeley Open 
Infrastructure for Network Computing), focuses on predicting the possible protein 
structures and also conducts side research focusing on Alzheimer’s disease, malaria, 
HIV and the herpes virus.10 As of May 16th 2012 the project boasts over 300 000 
active users and moves onward at an estimated speed of 119 TFLOPS.11 
Important though the discoveries of the two projects might be, they are not 
critical to the present discussion. What is important, however, is their magnitude and 
the scale of numbers of people and computers involved in them, clearly illustrating 
the magnitude, the popularity and the apparent attractiveness of said  research 
projects, again testifying to the biologically-oriented character of the “present 
cultural moment.” 
Poised at the extreme end of this moment is a group of thinkers, scientists and 
activists identifying themselves as transhumanists. Their general objective is to “push 
the boundaries of humanity,” which in the techno-scientific dimension translates into 
their vocal advocacy for the use of advanced technology, including genetic 
engineering, pharmacology, nanotechnology and cryonics, to radically intervene into 
the very composition of the human body in order to eliminate diseases and genetic 
disorders, increase human lifespan and to liberate the human species from its 
                                                          
7 http://folding.stanford.edu/English/Stats (16 May, 2012). 
8 http://i.top500.org/system/176544 (16 May, 2012). 
9 For the list see: http://folding.stanford.edu/English/Papers (16 May, 2012). 
10 http://boinc.bakerlab.org/rosetta/rah_about.php (16 May, 2012). 
11 http://boinc.bakerlab.org/rosetta/ (16 May, 2012). 
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biological constraints. For all their naïve optimism, it is becoming ever more 
apparent that the technology required to meet the transhumanist proposals is either 
already available or is being presently developed12 and both the transhumanists and 
their opponents recognise the imminence of the oncoming changes. James Hughes, 
the former executive director of the World Transhumanist Association writes with 
certainty: 
[i]n the twenty-first century the convergence of artificial 
intelligence, nanotechnology, and genetic engineering will allow 
human beings to achieve things previously imagined only in 
science fiction. Life spans will extend well beyond a century. Our 
senses and cognition will be enhanced. We will gain control over 
our emotions and memory. We will merge with machines, and 
machines will become more like humans. These technologies will 
allow us to evolve into varieties of 'posthumans' and usher us into 
the 'transhuman' era and society13 
and thus echoes in reverse a point made by Francis Fukuyama in the anti-
biotechnological Our Posthuman Future, where Fukuyama argues that “Huxley was 
right, that the most significant threat posed by contemporary biotechnology is the 
possibility that it will alter human nature and thereby move us into a 'posthuman' 
stage of history.”14 
Where Hughes sees opportunity, Fukuyama sees a threat, but both agree that 
there exists a necessity to respond to the challenges already looming over the 
technological, cultural, political and ethical horizons by adjusting the political and 
ethical discourses to meet those challenges.  And, non-accidently, both writers 
legitimise their points by a reference to science fiction, testifying to its privileged 
                                                          
12 See: Roco, Mihail, William S. Bainbridge, eds. Converging Technologies for Improving Human 
Performance (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 2002). 
13 James Hughes, Citizen Cyborg: Why Democratic Societies Must Respond to the Redesigned Human 
of the Future (Westview Press, 2004), p. xii. 
14 Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future. Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New 
York: Picador, 2002), p. 5. 
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status in the emergent bio-discourse, a point that shall be expanded upon in the 
following chapter. 
To understand that role it is necessary to take into account the third, inwardly 
pointed vector of evolutionary research. It is the evolutionary analysis of the human 
brain and mind and the behaviours they produce, and it is of particular interest to the 
humanities and the humanists inasmuch as it presents a new conception of the human 
psyche, an evolutionary account of the elusive human nature, and has already been 
appropriated to form the basis of a school of literary criticism. This school of 
Darwinian literary studies is a manifestation of a farther reaching project of 
(re)uniting the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities, using the idea 
of scientific consilience as its legitimising factor. 
Two works by Edward O. Wilson form the conceptual framework of these 
branches of evolutionary study. In the scientific dimension it is the 1971 
Sociobiology: A New Synthesis; in the philosophical dimension it is Consilience: The 
Unity of Knowledge. The former opened the very possibility of applying evolutionary 
approach to studying human behaviour by focusing on the impact of human 
evolutionary conditioning on the shape of elements constituent of human cultures, 
the latter  forms a conceptual framework for a restored meta-narration for the 
humanities, encouraging and justifying a profound interdisciplinarity. This 
interdisciplinary explanatory pluralism is emblematic of the Darwinian approach to 
analysing human behaviour. 
 
Evolutionary Explanations of Human Behaviour 
 
Sociobiology, as developed by researchers such as Robert Trivers, George Williams, 
William Hamilton and John Maynard Smith, focused on the functional significance 
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of animal behaviour, that is it sought to explain why evolution selected a particular 
behaviour and how it could be considered an adaptation.15 The sociobiologists 
mentioned first introduced such concepts as the gene's-eye view, reciprocal altruism, 
kin selection and evolutionary game theory. 
The gene's-eye view approach proved to be a key concept for the 
sociobiologist program. It was developed in response to the idea of group selection, 
whose advocates claimed that “many aspects of the social behaviour of animals 
could be explained by the idea that animals made sacrifices for the good of the 
group. ”16 V.C. Wynne-Edwards, a Scottish ethologist, argued in Animal Dispersion 
in Relation to Social Behaviour (1962) that in order to avoid overpopulation, 
potentially leading to a population crash in a habitat with limited resources, some 
individuals might altruistically forego reproduction in order not to put additional 
strain on the already scarce resources. Wynne-Edwards indicated that animal 
vocalisations and displays were means to enable individuals to assess population 
density and influence the reproductive decisions.17 
John Maynard Smith, David Lack and George C. Williams would challenge 
the group selection approach, arguing that the phenomena described by Wynne-
Edwards could be better explained in terms of individuals trying to maximize their 
own reproductive success. Williams in Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966) 
argued against group selection by pointing out that the movement of individuals 
between groups would weaken group selection and, more importantly, that those 
individuals who would be able to cheat the system, would out-compete other 
members of the population and could reproduce at their cost. Instead of group 
                                                          
15 Kevin Laland, Gillian Brown, Sense and Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human 
Behaviour (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 69. 
16 Laland, Brown, Sense and Nonsense, p. 73. 
17 Laland, Brown, Sense and Nonsense, p. 73-74. 
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selection, Williams offered an explanation from the perspective of a gene and the 
characteristics it would need to have in order to increase the chances of its 
representation in the next generation. Williams argued that a gene that would delay 
reproduction if the external conditions were so disadvantageous for the individual 
that it would be a waste of effort to engage in reproduction, might give the said 
individual a selective advantage over a gene compelling its carrier to engage in 
reproduction at all cost.18   
The gene's-eye view was encapsulated, perhaps misleadingly, in the slogan of 
“the selfish gene,” made famous by Richard Dawkins' book of that title published in 
1976. Not only did the book bring the gene's-eye perspective to a mass audience, but 
it also introduced the important concept of the “meme,” discussed later. 
Assuming the gene's view perspective proved to be a key element in 
explaining many problems which the biologists opposed to the idea of group 
selection had to face. One of these was the problem of altruism of an individual 
which forfeits its own chances of reproduction on behalf of another individual.  
In 1964 William Hamilton proposed a solution based on kinship. Related 
individuals share significant amount of copies of the same genes, and thus, by 
helping close kin to reproduce, they may increase the frequency of these common 
genes in the future generations.19 This type of behaviour will be selected, Hamilton 
argued, when the cost to the altruist is lower than the expected benefit to the relative 
multiplied by the probability of the relative possessing the same genes.  In two 
papers published in 1964 in The Journal of Theoretical Biology under a joint title 
“The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour,” Hamilton presented a mathematical 
                                                          
18 Laland, Brown, Sense and Nonsense, p. 74-75. 
19 William Hamilton, “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour I,” Journal of Theoretical 
Biology 7 (1964), p. 1. 
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formula for predicting when altruistic behaviour was likely to occur: c<br (where c is 
the cost of the altruistic behaviour, b is the benefit of the recipient, and r is the 
probability of the beneficient possessing the same genes as the donor).  
John Maynard Smith coined the phrase “kin selection” to refer to this type of 
behaviour and defined it as “the evolution of characteristics which favour the 
survival of close relatives of the affected individual, by processes which do not 
require any discontinuities in the population breeding structure.”20 Further research 
of altruistic behaviour led Robert Trivers to introduce the idea of reciprocal altruism. 
Trivers maintained that if even unrelated individuals interacted over an extended 
period of time, they might behave altruistically if there was a high probability that it 
would be reciprocated in the future. Though such a behaviour would be initially 
costly to the benefactor, over time both individuals involved would benefit, provided 
that the possibility of cheating and not reciprocating is eliminated. Trivers thus 
recognised, that reciprocal altruism is more likely to occur in populations with low 
dispersal rates, where individuals interact regularly and have a memory of previous 
interactions so that the cheaters are excluded from receiving altruistic benefits.21  
 Trivers came to a conclusion that reciprocal altruism “in the human species 
takes place in a number of contexts and in all known cultures”22 and attributed it to 
living conditions of the human Pleistocene ancestors, which met the criteria 
necessary for its development (stable groups, extended period of interactions, 
discrimination against cheaters). Trivers also argued that a number of human 
characteristics can be explained by reciprocal altruism. For instance, friendship can 
be understood in terms of engendering altruistic acts, but at the same time, altruistic 
                                                          
20 John Maynard Smith, “Group Selection and Kin Selection,” Nature 201 (4924) (1964), p. 1145-
1147. 
21 Robert Trivers, “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” The Quarterly Review of Biology vol. 46 
No.1 (1971), p. 45. 
22 Trivers, “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” p. 45. 
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acts serve to strengthen friendship. Likewise, moralistic aggression is a “protective 
mechanism” against unreciprocating individuals whose aim is  
to educate the unreciprocating individual by frightening him with 
immediate harm or future harm of no more aid; and in extreme 
cases, perhaps, to select directly against the unreciprocating 
individual by injuring, killing or exiling him.23 
Even despite the protective mechanisms in place, there exists an allowance for subtle 
cheating in which the recipient reciprocates but not as much as is expected of them. 
Trivers also suggested that gratitude regulates human response to altruistic acts and 
that it is sensitive to the cost/benefit ratio of these acts: the higher the benefit to the 
recipient the greater the gratitude and thus, possibly, the greater the future 
reciprocity.24  To provide means of calculating and describing complex trade-offs 
involved in reciprocal altruism, scientists analysing them turned to the economic 
game theory. Its evolutionary application is concerned with the dependency between 
an individual's behaviour and the behaviour of those around them. The goal is to 
analyse all possible strategies of behaviour against each other and to identify which 
would prove to be the most efficient and, consequently, the most evolutionarily 
stable.25 
This early form of sociobiology, with its interesting and relevant 
contributions to the study of animal social behaviour, would probably remain a fairly 
uncontroversial discipline but for the publication of Edward Wilson's Sociobiology: 
The New Synthesis in 1975.26 In the final chapter Wilson speculated about the 
evolutionary functionality of such specifically human traits as gender roles and 
religion and he made a case for rethinking social sciences so that they could be 
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connected with sociobiology. In that same chapter, Wilson asked a number of crucial 
questions: how much have the genetic traits developed in the past influenced the 
construct of human society? How flexible are these traits? How much are human 
traits adapted to the contemporary world and how much to the past environments? 
These questions would come to define the whole sociobiological family of sciences. 
Wilson seems to agree with Dobzhansky's claims of cultural processes 
gaining primacy over the genetic predispositions, yet he insists that genetic factors 
should not be completely excluded from the analyses of human behaviour. Instead 
Wilson argues for something of a cross between anthropology and genetics that 
would provide a fuller understanding of man. He summarised his ideas in the 
following way: 
Human beings inherit a propensity to acquire behavior and social 
structures, a propensity that is shared by enough people to be called 
human nature. The defining traits include division of labor between 
the sexes, bonding between kin, incest avoidance, other forms of 
ethical behavior, suspicion of strangers, tribalism, dominance 
orders within groups, male dominance over-all, and territorial 
aggression over limiting resources. Although people have free will 
and the choice to turn in many directions, the channels of their 
psychological development are nevertheless [...] cut more deeply 
by the genes in certain directions than in others. While cultures 
vary greatly, they inevitably converge toward these traits.27 
Needless to say, the proposition of such a radical reorientation of thinking of humans 
provoked a heated response. Events unfolding in the following years were, indeed, 
quite dramatic and the actual sequence of academic exchanges, arguments, debates 
attacks and counter-attacks (including actual physical assaults) is as intriguing as it is 
convoluted. Wilson’s proposed programme was accused of genetic prejudice, 
storytelling, reductionism and genetic determinism, and as a consequence of fierce 
debates raging over it has largely been re-labelled and re-modelled. 
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Among the chief critics of sociobiology was Richard Lewontin, who together 
with Rose and Kamin wrote in Not in Our Genes that “Sociobiology is a reductionist, 
biological determinist explanation of human existence. Its adherents claim […] that 
the details of present and past social arrangements are the inevitable manifestation of 
the specific action of genes.”28 This criticism is largely unfounded because 
sociobiology has always accepted the view that genes are not the sole influence on 
human behaviour, even if they play a part in influencing it. Hence evolutionary 
analyses should focus on the genes not because they are the only factor determinant 
of behaviour, but because they are the only heritable factor, and thus the only one 
that might be subject to natural selection.29 Laland and Brown point out that similar 
controversies over genetic determinism may come from the misunderstanding of the 
phrase “gene for.” A “gene for” a behaviour would not make that behaviour 
inevitable and fixed, but would merely denote that a particular behaviour might be 
preferred.30  
Other serious criticisms of sociobiology concerned its political aspects. 
Wilson's explanations of sex differences were considered conservative and 
promoting sex inequity, while his suggestions that there might be differences in 
mental aptitudes between different races opened the possibility of racist 
interpretations. Wilson, Dawkins and Maynard Smith had published letters in which 
they denied racist and extreme-right positions any place in sociobiology and 
disassociated themselves from such interpretations.31 
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Perhaps the strongest criticism of sociobiology centred around the view that it 
was doing little more than producing plausible stories of evolutionary foundations of 
behaviour. Lewontin, Rose and Kamin claimed that “imaginative stories have been 
told for ethics, religion, male domination, aggression, artistic ability, etc. All one 
need do is predicate a genetically determined contrast in the past and then use some 
imagination, in a Darwinian version of Kipling’s Just So Stories.”32 While the 
possibility of concocting evolutionary Just-So stories certainly exists, it is easily 
eliminated by the scientific heuristics of meticulous and rigorous research, in favour 
of which Wilson obviously argued. An allegation of reaching hasty conclusions 
based on insufficient evidence can be made against researchers in any field, yet it 
would not undermine the general validity of that field. Nonetheless, an over-eager 
approach of certain sociobiologists which led them to produce superficial 
explanations of behaviour, often focusing solely on their evolutionary aspects with 
disregard to non-evolutionary factors, has been largely recognised and was certainly 
detrimental to the reception of sociobiologist ideas.  
In the light of these criticisms, sociobiology was largely rejected by social 
scientists. Ultimately, however, as Ullica Segerstrale writes, “Wilson’s important 
contribution consisted in the fact that he created a field by showing its scattered 
practitioners that it existed. And Wilson not only gave the field a name, he also 
advocated its feasibility and importance in a social climate suspicious of evolution 
and the genetics of behavior.”33 One result of the aggressive debate over 
sociobiology was that it brought its ideas to a wider attention, which, in turn, inspired 
a host of other evolutionary approaches to analysing and explaining human 
behaviour.  
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Spurred by the sociobiological debates, a number of scientists undertook a 
program of testing the ideas of sociobiology against data collected from real 
populations. With the main premise being that human behaviour strategies are indeed 
adaptive across a range of ecological and social conditions, the point of interest 
became whether human behaviour could flexibly adjust to changing environmental 
conditions. Whereas traditional anthropology focuses on how culture influences 
behaviour, Darwinian anthropology, labelled as human behavioural ecology, does the 
opposite: its aim is to “determine how ecological and social factors affect 
behavioural variability within and between populations”34 and how the said 
variability produces cultural differences. While the research focused on traditionally 
anthropological topics such as kinship, marriage and social stratification using 
methods and data of typically anthropological varieties, “[t]he novel element was the 
use of such data to test hypotheses derived from the theoretical expectation that 
human social behaviour would reflect strategies that would enhance inclusive fitness 
in environments similar to those of past human evolution.”35  
The central notion of behavioural ecology is that humans are able to flexibly 
alter their behaviour in response to changing environmental factors, in order to 
maximize their reproductive success. Behavioural ecologists claim that humans are 
able to adjust their strategy by weighing up the benefits and costs of a given 
behaviour and choosing the optimal solution (i.e., one that maximizes the benefit-
cost difference). The adjustment is considered to be rapid, hence behavioural 
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ecologists would claim that there is little adaptation lag between behaviour and the 
socioecological environment in which it takes place.36 
In practice, behavioural ecology consists in testing optimal models of 
behaviour, built on the basis of mathematical evolutionary theory, against actual 
behaviour displayed in a given situation. If the data fit the model, the hypothesis of 
the model providing an accurate description of a behavioural strategy is upheld. The 
same process is repeated in different environments and the data can be compared. If, 
in turn, the data do not support the model, it can either be revised and re-tested until 
it eventually provides an understanding of a particular population or the model can 
be rejected with the conclusion that people do not behave optimally in a given 
situation.37 Human behavioural ecologists assume a piecemeal approach, and 
maintain that a reductionist approach – analysing singled-out aspects or elements of 
even very complex behaviour – can prove to be fruitful. If relatively simple 
analytical models provide researchers with testable hypotheses, they can be 
combined and extended into a fuller description.38 
The behavioural ecology research programme, too, came under heavy 
criticism. Donald Symons argued that behavioural ecology did not indeed form 
hypotheses about human adaptations but “established which behaviour patterns 
appeared adaptive.”39 Symons drew attention to the distinction between an 
adaptation, that is a character favoured by natural selection, and a character that is 
adaptive, i.e., currently performing a function which increases reproductive success. 
Consequently, it becomes clear, that certain human adaptations might no longer be 
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adaptive, and that certain features which are not adaptations might nonetheless have 
fortuitous effects, i.e., be adaptive. 
Symons argued that the adaptations affecting human behaviour were to be 
found at the psychological level and thus distinguished between an adaptivist 
approach which tries to identify adaptive behaviour (which may have no relation 
with actual adaptations), and an adaptationist approach which searches for these 
psychological mechanisms that are true adaptations that regulate behaviour. He 
wrote: 
almost none of the phenomena of interest to social scientists – 
polyandry, bride wealth, the avunculate, and so forth – are 
themselves adaptations. Whether or not they are adaptive, they 
cannot be adaptations, because they are not descriptions of 
phenotypic design. Darwinism can be applied to social phenomena 
only insofar as it illuminates the psychological adaptations that 
underpin these phenomena.40 
Behavioural ecologists counter these criticisms by maintaining that it is insignificant 
whether humans behave adaptively because of their psychological mechanisms, 
learning or culture, as long as the behaviour remains adaptive, blurring or outright 
ignoring the distinction between psychological and behavioural adaptations.  
The idea that humans behave optimally is another problem for behavioural 
ecology. If the data gathered during research do not conform to the theoretical 
optimal model of behaviour, it is either because the model is faulty and requires 
revision or because humans do not behave optimally. Behavioural ecologists are 
reluctant to draw the second conclusion41 and prefer focusing on adjusting the 
theoretical model to fit the data gathered. This carries an obvious risk of being 
endlessly trapped in the process of collecting and comparing data, without ever 
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reaching the conclusion of maladaptability. Symons recognizes and draws attention 
to a potential threat in such a model of research: 
To the adaptivist data like these [i.e. evidence of suboptimal 
behaviour] are a theoretical challenge; the typical adaptivist's 
response to such a challenge is to cast about some ad hoc reason 
why apparently maladaptive behaviour might conceivably be more 
adaptive than it seems.42 
Symons' criticisms of behavioural ecology gave rise to a different tradition in  
evolutionary studies. Symons, together with Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, are the 
chief proponents of this approach, which is focused mainly on the evolved 
psychological mechanisms which constitute the basis for human behaviour. They 
labelled this approach Darwinian psychology or evolutionary psychology and 
highlighted its disparity with behavioural ecology: 
[m]any researchers have made a conceptual 'wrong turn', leaving a 
gap in the evolutionary approach that has limited its effectiveness. 
This wrong turn has consisted of attempting to apply evolutionary 
theory directly to the level of manifest behavior, rather than using it 
as a heuristic guide for the discovery of innate psychological 
mechanisms.43 
Cosmides and Tooby firmly claim that “natural selection cannot select for behavior 
per se; it can only select for mechanisms that produce behaviour.”44 David Buss 
illustrates this precept with jealousy as an example: a male experiencing this emotion 
at the sight of their partner interacting friendly with another male might have a 
selective advantage over those that would remain passive in a similar situation. 
However, the choice of  particular behaviour in this situation would depend on a 
variety of factors and would be highly context-dependent, making any predictions as 
to the actual behaviour very difficult.  Evolutionary psychologist do nonetheless 
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confidently expect the experience of jealousy to be reliably predictable, thus 
constituting a psychological mechanism.45  
According to evolutionary psychologists, these cognitive mechanisms, which 
are complex adaptations, evolved slowly in an ancestral environment vastly different 
from the modern one. John Bowlby's term of “the Environment of Evolutionary 
Adaptedness” was adopted to refer to this past selective environment: 
The recognition that adaptive specializations have been shaped by 
the statistical features of ancestral environments is especially 
important in the study of human behaviour. Human psychological 
mechanisms should be adapted to those environments, not 
necessarily to the twentieth century industrialized world.46 
Two conclusions follow from such a concept of the EEA. Firstly, by establishing 
which types of problems might have been encountered by human ancestors in the 
EEA it may be possible to deduce which mechanisms evolved to cope with these 
problems.47 Secondly, there exists a possibility of adaptation lag: if the psychological 
mechanisms evolved over an extended period of time during the Pleistocene, then the 
relatively recent post-Paleolithic changes in the human environment would have  
occurred too fast for significant evolution of these mechanisms to have taken place. 
Thus, some of the responses triggered by these mechanisms might be maladaptive. 
A key assumption of evolutionary psychology is that the evolved 
psychological mechanisms are highly specialised or domain specific. Buss argues 
that it is so because: 
(1) general solutions fail to guide the organism to the correct 
adaptive solutions; (2) even if they do work, general solutions lead 
to too many errors and thus are costly to the organism and (3) what 
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constitutes a 'successful solution' differs from problem to 
problem.48 
Thus, in order to cope with a large number of complex problems, the human mind 
must have a massively modular structure, i.e., it must be composed of hundreds of 
specialised mechanisms responsible for domains as diverse as mating, friendship, 
predator avoidance, social exchange and sexual behaviour.49 
All the tenets of evolutionary psychology are subject to criticisms. According 
to Robert Foley, the concept of the EEA “raises a number of questions about the 
specificity of what exactly it is or was.”50 There is a recognised tendency among 
evolutionary psychologists to stereotype the EEA as African Pleistocene savannah,51 
but Foley argues that it is necessary to acknowledge that the human hunter-gatherer 
ancestors lived in a much wider range of environments and displayed a large 
variation in behaviour. Foley argues that 
[m]uch of the variability among hunter-gatherers is regional, and 
both cultural and environmental factors are at play. It is clear that 
there are major ecologically driven differences for example 
between arctic Inuit and desert-dwelling San […] It is also the case, 
however, that marked differences exist between hunter-gatherers in 
similar environments but in different geographical regions.52   
In order for an exhaustive evolutionary analysis to take place, it would be necessary 
(although nigh impossible) to recreate the conditions of the EEA taking all the 
variables into account. 
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Instead, what Foley proposes, with some support from Cosmides and 
Tooby53,  is that the EEA be conceived of as a general notion of past human 
environment, “a shorthand for the human evolutionary heritage.”54 Rather than being 
a set and defined time and place, the EEA is a general concept of the past, since 
many evolutionary problems remain constant regardless of their environment and 
humans must therefore show some adaptation to them.   
Laland and Brown draw attention to another problem with the EEA: present-
day humans cannot be adapted exclusively to past environments. Human natural 
selection has not stopped, therefore individuals must also exhibit at least partial 
adaptation to the present conditions.55 Moreover, there is disagreement as to the time 
necessary for natural selection to have taken place. While it is generally assumed that 
the complex adaptations necessary for the human brain to evolve to its present form 
must have taken a long time, there is evidence that biological evolution can be much 
faster. Research by Kingsolver et al. suggests, however, that natural selection can 
cause significant adaptive modifications in an organism in as little as a hundred 
generations.56 
Criticisms are also directed at the idea of domain-specificity of psychological 
mechanisms. While there are benefits from evolved domain-specific mechanisms, it 
is inconceivable that the mind would be able to develop a mechanism for every 
possible situation or problem. Too much specificity would simply be too costly to 
maintain and hence detrimental to performance. Domain general-processes would be 
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selected in cases where they “make a good enough job at low cost.”57 From these 
reservations follows the conclusion that at least some mental processes are domain-
general, although the domain-specific remains dominant within evolutionary 
psychology.58 
Yet another serious criticism of evolutionary psychology focuses on the 
extreme adaptationism of evolutionary psychologists. A model of evolution based 
solely on natural selection is largely outdated. There is a growing recognition that 
many traits are not adaptations and are instead exaptations (that is characters which 
now enhance fitness, but were not developed for their current role through natural 
selection), side-effects of adaptations, or are the result of genetic drift, i.e., random 
genetic changes. Natural selection itself is also increasingly recognised to be much 
more complex than previously thought. Laland and Brown quote Endler's claim that 
there are 21 processes involved in natural selection, some of which operate below the 
level of an individual organism, and some of which operate above that level.59  
None of these criticisms appears to definitely undermine the scope and 
ambitions of evolutionary psychology. Rather, they facilitate the understanding of 
complexities involved in evolutionary research. Yet, it is clear that evolutionary 
psychology needs to refine its understanding of evolutionary processes, and needs to 
develop  more rigorous techniques for testing its hypotheses. While the overall tone 
of evolutionary psychology research remains optimistic and even enthusiastic, and 
while it has already provided illuminating insights into the nature of the human mind, 
it has to be recognised that evolutionary psychology has shown significant neglect 
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for the role of cultural processes involved in the shaping of  human selective 
environment.60 
The cultural processes became, however, the object of interest of Richard 
Dawkins, who, in the final chapter of The Selfish Gene, introduced an intriguing idea. 
Dawkins suggested that cultural phenomena – fashions, fads and trends, but also 
language, art and technology – evolve over time by means of replicators, which are 
of similar nature to genes. Dawkins wrote: 
We need a name for the new replicator, a noun that conveys the 
idea of a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation. 
“Mimeme” comes from a suitable Greek root, but I want a 
monosyllable that sounds a bit like 'gene'. I hope my classicist 
friends will forgive me if I abbreviate mimeme to 'meme.'61 
Dawkins considers memes to be units of information or ideas and suggests that they 
posses all the features necessary for evolution, and the qualities of good replicators: 
variation, heredity and differential fitness as well as longevity and the ability to be 
copied effectively with some degree of accuracy. From drawing the parallels 
between genes and memes follows the assumption of the meme's-eye view, that is 
analysing cultural phenomena from the point of view of the meme in order to 
understand how and why they evolved. Again, in parallel with the gene, Dawkins 
proposed that if genes “are active agents, working purposefully for their own 
survival, perhaps it might be convenient to think of memes in the same way.”62 
He further suggested that it is not humans who pick their memes, but to the 
contrary, it is the memes which choose humans as hosts and influence their 
behaviour to their own ends. According to Dawkins “a cultural trait may have 
evolved in the way it has simply because it is advantageous to itself”63 and it need 
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not have an obvious beneficial influence on human fitness. Indeed some memes may 
have a negative influence: it is highly unlikely that a gene for celibacy would be 
selected for, but if a meme of celibacy increased a priests ability to influence their 
followers, and hence aid in the spread of related memes (i.e., religion) it would be 
likely to be selected for. 
Dawkins proposed that “memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by 
leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called 
imitation.”64 Laland and Brown expand upon this description and suggest that there 
are three distinct forms of meme transition and acquisition: copying the process 
(reproducing a behaviour), copying the product (reverse-engineering the 
informational content of the meme) and copying the instructions (utilising a syntactic 
description of the meme).65 A major problem in meme transmission is fidelity. 
Cultural transmission involves an immense amount of variation, recombination and 
flexibility and hence it may be questionable to think of memes as effective 
replicators.  Here, Laland and Brown claim that despite being variable between 
individuals, all memes possess “a core element that is shared knowledge”66 and, they 
add, it is natural for this core element to change over time. Dan Sperber, in turn, 
argued against meme transmission and instead put forward a hypothesis that memes 
are reconstructed independently by individuals. The appearance of the same meme in 
different individuals can then be attributed to the incorporation of evolved 
psychological mechanisms in the recreation of the meme (i.e., a similar brain 
structure). 67 
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The memetic approach to culture, quite predictably, was met with a number 
of critcism. One of the more easily shrugged off is that is considerably difficult to 
define the boundaries of a meme. Seemingly, in comparison with the clear-cut gene, 
the meme idea appears to be somewhat hazy. Laland and Brown counter this 
allegation by arguing that the gene is not a well defined concept either, that there 
exist varying definitions of it and even disagreements among biologists as to what 
constitutes a species, and yet these have not prevented progress in evolutionary 
biology. In a surprisingly blunt and shockingly inadequate conclusion, Laland and 
Brown advise memeticists to “get on with it.”68  
Another criticism, and an apparent problem with memes, concerns their 
lineage. Stephen Gould argues that “[b]iological evolution is a system of constant 
divergence without subsequent joining of branches. Lineages, once distinct, are 
separate forever. In human history, transmission across lineages is, perhaps, the 
major source of cultural change,”69 thus stressing the disparity between the cultural 
and biological processes, which might undermine the central axiom of memetics.  
Laland and Brown yet again counter this allegation by invoking cases when two 
biological species have actually merged together or entered into symbiotic relations, 
both situations serving as examples of phenomena in which genetical lineages come 
into horizontal contact and repeatedly merge and split. Laland and Brown argue that 
since tracing down genetical lineages is nonetheless possible for geneticists, so it will 
be possible for memeticists, despite the increased speed with which memes evolve. 
The biggest reservation to memetics is that it has not reached science status 
yet. The speed with which memes mutate and our disability to read them within the 
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brain constitute important obstacles in empirical memetic research. Simply, there is 
no established rigorous methodology for doing memetics,70 even though certain 
methods are proposed and promising research is being conducted. Laland and Brown 
tentatively suggest a set of methods appropriated from Endler’s experimental means 
of detecting natural selection,71 while Hull proposes that the study of the mechanisms 
of memetic transmission might be a valid starting point for the science: 
Memeticists cannot begin to understand what the science of 
memetics is until they generate general beliefs about conceptual 
changes and try to test them. These tests are likely to look fairly 
paltry, but in the early stages of a science, attempts at testing 
always look paltry.72 
With all the reservations taken into account, memetics still offers a potentially useful 
tool in quantitative analysis of cultural processes. Even if it does not provide us with 
a holistic and comprehensive theory of human nature, memetic research, if conducted 
rigorously, might bring insights into the causes, patterns and rates of cultural 
evolution. As of the present, however, memetics remains an unrealised theoretical 
possibility, and the apparent lack of results seems to be causing a waning of interest 
in it. 
A more integrated approach was developed to account for the interactions 
between biological and cultural evolution. Called the Dual Inheritance Theory or 
Gene-Culture Coevolution, this approach is a  functional cross between evolutionary 
psychology and memetics. The foundations for the theory of gene-culture 
coevolution were laid out independently by Edward Wilson and Charles Lamsden in 
Genes, Mind and Culture, and Luca Cavalli-Sforza and Marcus Feldman in Cultural 
Transmission and Evolution, both published in 1981. Lumsden and Wilson describe 
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gene-culture coevolution as “a complicated, fascinating interaction in which culture 
is generated and shaped by biological imperatives while biological traits are 
simultaneously altered by genetic evolution in response to cultural innovation.”73 
Like memetics, gene-culture coevolution assumes that culture displays the 
characteristics necessary for evolution (inheritance, variability, fitness effects) and 
thus is subject to processes of cultural selection. Gene-culture coevolutionists 
consider culture to be a pool of ideas, beliefs and values which are learned and 
transmitted between individuals. Like evolutionary psychology, gene-culture 
coevolution assumes that the cultural knowledge an individual adopts may depend on 
their genetic constitution (although it does not necessarily have to). These gene-
culture dependencies are reciprocal: cultural choices may cause selective pressures 
which will in turn influence the genes.74  Gene-culture coevolution thus provides a 
pluralistic explanation of human behaviour and stresses its codetermination by a 
variety of environmental, genetic and cultural factors.75 
The feature that distinguishes gene-culture coevolution from other approaches 
is its recognition of and interest in non-adaptive or maladaptive results of 
evolutionary processes. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman  introduce the concept of 
cultural selection, i.e., a process by which a particular piece of cultural information 
increases or decreases in frequency (is either adopted or rejected). According to 
them, cultural selection can work against natural selection: fertility control is a 
popular choice in developed countries, yet it is a clear disadvantage in terms of 
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natural selection as it leads to fewer offspring. Genetic fitness decreases due to the 
high cultural fitness of the idea of contraception.76   
If cultural information is altered before it is passed on, cultural traditions will 
change. Boyd and Richerson in Culture and the Evolutionary Process (1985) give 
account of how cultural information can be changed. They differentiate between 
guided variation, that is a process by which individuals acquire knowledge of a 
behaviour from others and then modify this behaviour according to their personal 
experience, and various types of biased cultural transmission. Direct bias refers to a 
genetic predisposition to favour certain information; frequency-dependent bias refers 
to a situation in which the observed frequency or rarity of a behaviour influences its 
adoption (with the obvious conclusion that the more common the behaviour the more 
often it is adopted); finally, in the case of indirect bias, individuals use cues about a 
trait (e.g., wealth) to choose which individuals to observe in order to obtain 
information about another trait (e.g., fashion).77 
William Durham identifies five categories of gene-culture interaction 
responsible for the variations in human behaviour and society: genetic mediation, in 
which cultural variation is caused by genetic differences; cultural mediation, in 
which it is the cultural change which causes genetic change; enhancement, in which 
cultural behaviour reinforces genetic predispositions; neutrality, in which cultural 
variations are adopted independently of genetic predispositions and finally 
opposition, in which culture leads to maladaptive behaviours.78 
A serious obstacle to a wider adoption of gene-culture coevolution 
perspective is the complexity of mathematical models necessary for performing 
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analyses and constructing theoretical descriptive models of the interconnected 
cultural and genetic processes and calculating the probabilities of adopting particular 
traits.79 A serious obstacle to doing so is the difficulty in dividing culture into 
discrete units. The concept of the meme, or Lumsden's and Wilson's idea of a 
“culturgene,” almost synonymous with meme, might prove helpful here, and Laland 
and Brown insist that it is possible to identify distinct elements of culture, thus 
opening the way for their advanced analysis.80 
However, with the recognition that biological evolution might be faster than 
previously expected and with the necessary recognition that some cultural 
phenomena remain relatively stable over long periods of time, the apparent speed 
discrepancy between cultural and genetic evolution disappears. This opens a realistic 
opportunity for empirical study of gene-culture coevolution, although the potential 
remains unrealised.  
 
Scientific Consilience 
 
With a growing body of knowledge made available in the aftermath of a debate he 
himself started, and with a growing conviction of the validity of the evolutionary 
paradigm, E. O. Wilson put forward the claim that the natural sciences have become 
largely consilient81 and that the social sciences must (or will) become consilient with 
them too. Consilience means that sciences form an explanatory hierarchy – 
biological processes are explained through chemistry which is explained through 
physics – and that theories of sciences at the higher levels of that hierarchy must be 
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compatible with the laws of lower levels. If they are not, a revision is necessary. 
Since biology and psychology are already becoming consilient,82 by necessity the 
social sciences and the humanities will have to follow suit in order to make their 
contributions relevant and useful. 
Wilson claimed that within social sciences there are no efforts to link and 
connect the various disciplines and that these disciplines exist separately, divided and 
without any unifying concepts.83 He attributed these divisions to the social scientists' 
rejection of the hierarchical vision of science. Understandably, the social sciences 
could not achieve consilience with the natural sciences as there is no (or little) place 
allowed within social sciences for biological forces of the kind proposed by 
sociobiology, and thus no attempts were made to trace causal patterns across the 
biological and social domains.84 Wilson  proposed that in order to provide accurate 
descriptions of cultural or political activities, social scientists should move from the 
genetic level, to brain science, to psychology and only then to social study. Such a 
wide analysis would endow social scientists with more knowledge about why 
humans act and behave the way they do, and would provide a stable ground for 
research more oriented to solving problems than idle theoretical disputes over 
terminology. 
 Wilson's case is compelling. The natural sciences do interconnect more and 
more. The host of sociobiological approaches develops more accurate methods for 
their analyses and  brings promising results. In advocating their larger adoption by 
the social sciences, Wilson presents an extremely tempting “prospect of intellectual 
                                                          
82 cf. Wilson, Consilience, p. 137 – 180. 
83 Wilson, Consilience, p. 201. 
84 Wilson, Consilience, p. 208-209. 
36 
 
adventure”85 reminiscent of the sense of marvel that must have accompanied the 
Enlightenment pioneers of modern science in their endeavours (underlined by his 
frequent references to de Condorcet). The necessity for interdisciplinary cooperation 
at all levels, from institutional to personal, arising from the very complexity of the 
subject matter, might facilitate the bridging of the gap between the social and natural 
scientific cultures. Ultimately, Wilson's scientific consilience might lead to 
“understanding the human condition with a higher degree of certainty,”86 a goal as of 
yet unattained by either the social sciences or the humanities. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Consilience is not a blind attempt to reduce the study of very complex human 
phenomena to biochemical, cellular processes or indeed all science to the level of 
particle physics. As Henry Plotkin argues, studying the fundamental levels of 
phenomena allows for their most comprehensive understanding, but not all levels of 
fundamentality are equal: complex structures often have multiple levels of causative 
mechanisms, and for practical (and institutional) reasons scientists work to provide 
explanations of the world at the levels fundamental to their respective disciplines.87 
Consilience is an organising principle, according to which these explanations should 
not contradict each other. 
 What this means for the humanities, and the humanist, is that the analyses of 
social and cultural phenomena cannot contradict the findings of human life sciences, 
in which the evolutionary paradigm reigns supreme. What it means for literary 
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studies, is the necessity of an emergence of a theoretical paradigm aligned with the 
evolutionary one. 
38 
 
CHAPTER 2: DARWINIAN LITERARY STUDIES AND THE 
ROLE OF SCIENCE FICTION  
 
Walt was a real person and no doubt that was why NASA 
had selected him. His genes – they were probably stuffed 
to overflowing with four thousand years of culture, the 
heritage of mankind built right in. 
Philip K. Dick, Dr. Bloodmoney 
 
The appropriation of the evolutionarily oriented thought into a meta-narration for a 
critical and theoretical paradigm proceeds through the rejection of the post-modern, 
non-consilient, epistemology and the literary-theoretical paradigm arising from it, in 
favour of an epistemology based on and derived from biological premises, which, for 
contrast, is referred to as either bioepistemology or evolutionary epistemology.  
 The first two sections of this chapter outline the arguments on which the 
rejection is based and present the bioepistemological alternative, while the following 
three sections discuss the potential adaptive functions of, respectively, art, fiction and 
science fiction. 
 
Against Theory  
 
In The Postmodern Turn, an attempt to outline the scope and depth of the 
paradigmatic shift, Best and Kellner enumerate four core features of the postmodern: 
the rejection of “unifying, totalizing, and universal schemes in favour of new 
emphases on difference, plurality, fragmentation and complexity”88 or in Lyotard's 
terms, the rejection of meta-narratives in favour of local narratives; the rejection of 
“closed structure, fixed meaning and rigid order in favour of play, indeterminacy, 
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incompleteness, uncertainty, ambiguity, contingency and chaos,”89  which Best and 
Kellner illustrate with postructuralist theories of linguistic indeterminacy; the 
rejection of “naive realism and epistemology, as well as unmediated objectivity and 
truth in favour of perspectivism, anti-foundationalism, hermeneutics, intertextuality, 
simulation and relativism”90 and, lastly, an emphasis on “deconstructing boundaries 
within and among different disciplines,”91 quoting Derrida's attack on the distinction 
of philosophy and literature, postmodern fiction's blurring of the boundaries between 
fiction and history and pop art's blurring the boundaries between art and everyday 
life as examples.  
It is obvious from the preceding discussion that broad interdisciplinarity is at 
the core of Wilson idea of scientific consilience. What is the object of Darwinist 
criticism, however, is the particular form of interdisciplinarity practised and 
celebrated by certain postructuralist thinkers. Richard Levin's article “The New 
Interdisciplinarity in Literary Criticism” published  in After Postructuralism: 
Interdisciplinarity and Literary Theory, draws attention to its problematic character. 
Levin uses a number of examples of Freudian and Marxist critics to illustrate how a 
theory from a given discipline is chosen as an analytical tool for another discipline 
not on the basis of its correctness but on the basis of its usefulness for the critic.  The 
two most striking examples he quotes are of Jean Kennard use of Joseph Zinker's 
psychological theory  because she is “comfortable with it” and of Catherine Belsey's 
turning to Freudian psychoanalysis because of its potential to challenge the “existing 
order” and to undermine “the unitary subject of bourgeois ideology” with 
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pronounced disregard to the criteria of truth and correctness of the theory.92 A theory 
selected on the basis of its utility will always work as an interpretative tool. As Levin 
writes “no failure has ever been recorded.”93 He illustrates this point by the Freudian 
analyses of Shakespeare's plays which presuppose that a hero must have problems 
with mothering. Levin quotes an impressive list of critics who would find mother-
figures in female, male and even non-human characters of the plays. The focus on 
the presence of the mother is perhaps brought to an absurd level by Coppelia Kahn's 
insistence that “the mother's absence is evidence for her presence”94, a claim which 
renders the theory unfalsifiable. It retains its political value but can no longer be 
considered scientific. Levin's bitter theses are echoed by Dylan Evans' remark on the 
popularity of Lacanian psychology in literary criticism. Evans, himself a 
psychologist, argues that despite Lacan's apparent small significance for clinical 
psychoanalysis his popularity among literary scholars stems from the political 
usefulness of his theory.95 
Similar objections were raised by Brian Boyd, quite possibly the most vocal 
critic of the post-structuralist paradigm among the literary Darwinists. In his 2006 
paper “Theory is Dead – Like a Zombie,” he delivers an emblematic critique of the 
theoretical paradigm. Boyd locates the reason for the enthusiastic embrace of the 
post-structuralist position  in the political and ideological motivations of thinkers and 
researchers lured in by the seemingly liberating potential of Theory and argues that 
“[t]he liberationist rhetoric of Derrida, Barthes and Foucault in the late 1960s helped 
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create a sense of intoxicating avant-gardism, as if they were shaking the foundations 
of Western thought and power, and stirring the hope that merely by questioning 
conventions and reversing hierarchies the whole social system could be 
transformed.”96 One unfortunate consequence of this enthusiastic attack on 
hierarchies and traditional systems of values is the assumption of a decidedly anti-
positivist a priori mode of thinking and writing, resulting in a certain devaluation of 
evidence and the neglect of counter-evidence and a preference for the readings and 
theories which are more politically appealing rather than scientifically verified.  
Boyd comments with a particular bitterness: “not that Derrida and Barthes were 
interested so much in getting things right as in appearing challenging, shocking, 
revolutionary,” mirroring objections raised by Levin about the practice of critics 
choosing “whatever suits their taste, which turns out to be whatever is useful for their 
political or critical projects”97 as a theoretical analytic tool with utter disregard as to 
the actual correctness of the method chosen. 
The end result is a creation of an essentially closed hegemonic system, ruled 
by obscure jargon98 and legitimising itself – paradoxically, given its professed anti-
authoritarian streak – by reverent references to the authority of a small number of 
leading figures:  
The practice of Theory has contradicted its central tenets so 
blatantly for so long that the contradictions would be comic were 
they not tragic. Although Theorists declare meaning to be 
indeterminate, endlessly unresolvable, they expected the precise 
meaning of such claims to be readily understood. When others took 
issue with their works, they insisted on their own meanings, 
although their insistence that authors’ intentions have no particular 
value should have ruled out such proceedings. They rejected the 
transparency of or even the appeal to evidence, except for evidence 
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they wished to advance (especially striking in the appeal to 
evidence in the attempted defense of Paul de Man for his wartime 
anti-Semitic writings). Theory’s allure [...] was largely in its anti-
authoritarian stance, but the appeal to authority (“as Foucault has 
shown”) has been as requisite within Theory as invocations of 
Lenin within Soviet scholarship, and has led to an academic star 
system in the humanities that elevated individuals and constellated 
them as authorities to a hitherto unprecedented degree. Theory’s 
proclamations of radical uncertainty have been issued and repeated 
with rare certainty, with a meaning and a truth value confidently 
ascribed to the authoritative and authorizing author, so long as that 
author was, say, a Derrida, a Barthes or a Lyotard. The insistence 
on the primacy of Theory, in short, has been made through a deeply 
untheoretical appeal to authority, even to authorities whose ideas 
conflict with one another—or with themselves, as in the 
widespread claim that all ideas are merely local, except, apparently, 
this universal “truth” or many another “always” or “always 
already,” like Frederic Jameson’s “Always historicize.”99 
The Darwinists are not the first to raise these powerful, and often-times correct 
objections. Rather, they draw on the heritage of the Science Wars (which, it has to be 
noted, were themselves, to a degree, influenced by the conflict over sociobiology) 
and clamor for a continuation (or a rematch), arguing that the sense of intellectual 
bankruptcy, an academic malaise which stems from the recognition of Theory's 
trappings, is sufficient proof that a revolution in the humanities is needed and 
necessary and that it should reach further and deeper than a mere tightening of 
intellectual discipline and closer adherence to textual proof. Whether the situation of 
literary theory is as dire as Boyd makes it out to be is far beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, although an intuitive answer of “probably not” would likely be correct. 
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The Darwinian Paradigm for Culture and Literary Studies 
 
 In “Making Knowledge: Bioepistemology and the Foundations of Literary Theory,” 
Nancy Easterlin identifies the preference for “strong constructivism,” i.e., the view 
that knowledge is made up rather than made to be a common denominator between 
the host of contemporary literary theories. She links this preference with a sceptical 
epistemology which denies the possibility of truth and knowledge and underlies 
approaches as seemingly diverse as neopragmatism, deconstructionism or New 
Historicism. Easterlin points to a practical consequence of this sceptical position: 
“while motivated by a moral desire for liberal or radical social change, its underlying 
epistemology tells us that we cannot know anything, which would include the ability 
to discriminate between better or worse social conditions and to take remedial 
action.”100 
In contrast, Easterlin proposes a shift towards bioepistemology, which is 
based on the central assumption that 
given evolutionary theory as the most plausible account of human 
origins, the human mind as a result of natural selection is 
predisposed in ways that have proven adaptively advantageous; 
from this central premise it follows that questions regarding the 
nature of human knowledge can be answered through an 
understanding of certain predispositions (e.g., cognitive 
adaptations).  Accordingly, the conceptual tendencies which 
enabled primitive man to overcome complexity and act in the 
interests of survival have direct bearing on the construction of 
knowledge within human culture.101 
 
The view is grounded in the propositions of Karl Popper, claiming that “[l]ife is 
problem solving and discovery”102 and of Konrad Lorenz, insisting that “all human 
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knowledge derives from a process of interaction between man as a physical entity, an 
active, perceiving subject, and the realities of an equally physical external world, the 
object of man's perception.”103 Thus, humans are able to “acquire relevant 
information about the world and to use this information for their survival.”104 From 
this perspective meaning and knowledge are produced by physiological structures 
(such as the sense organs) rather than by cultural and linguistic codes, and their 
existence is not only possible and desirable but biologically necessary. The 
continuous survival and the apparent successes of the homo sapiens, the billions of 
successful daily communicative situations, the transmission of vast amounts of 
information and the coordination of powerful social efforts all serve as ubiquitous 
empirical evidence of the position's correctness. 
In her article Easterlin further voices the amusement at the fact that “[i]n light 
of the denial of human agency which has become commonplace in literary 
theory […] it is nothing short of miraculous that a field devoted to studying the 
artifacts of human culture has survived at all”105 and adds that “to be meaningful, 
discussion of the artifacts of human culture must be framed by our knowledge of 
human beings, not by artificial or incomplete notions of our world and our social 
experience.”106 
Needless to say, a school of critical theory derived from such premises, based 
on sharp distinction between the subject and the object and the rejection of the 
primacy of language and linguistic constructivism has to conflict with the currently 
dominant critical perspectives. The Darwinist diagnosis of the state of literary theory 
proceeds from the recognition that the central claims of the primacy of language and 
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hence the conventional, arbitrary and discursive character of all knowledge, meaning, 
the symbolic systems of values and ideologies, and ultimately human nature itself, 
are simply incorrect, because they neglect and ignore the existence of the innate, 
biological conditionings and their influence on the shaping of human culture. Thus, 
Joseph Carroll, a leading proponent of the Darwinian critical paradigm, states with 
certainty: 
If a theory of culture and literature is true, it can be assimilated to 
the Darwinian paradigm; and if it cannot be reconciled with the 
Darwinian paradigm, it is not true. The poststructuralist 
explanation of things cannot be reconciled with the Darwinian 
paradigm. It cannot merely be modified and assimilated to the 
Darwinian paradigm. It is an alternative, competing paradigm. It 
operates on principles that are wholly different and fundamentally 
incompatible with those of evolutionary theory. It should, 
consequently, be rejected.107 
It is of note, however, that the literary Darwinists do not merely argue against 
psychoanalytical criticism and in favour of an evolutionary psychological one. 
Carroll's quote contains a much farther-reaching mission statement which involves a 
summary rejection of all contemporary theory rather than any of its claims in 
particular. Carroll, indeed, speaks of a paradigmatic revolution in the Kuhnian sense 
of supplanting an inadequate paradigm with a more accurate one; to achieve that goal 
the literary Darwinists 
rally to Edward O. Wilson’s cry for “consilience” among all the 
branches of learning. Like Wilson, they envision an integrated 
body of knowledge extending in an unbroken chain of material 
causation from the lowest level of subatomic particles to the 
highest levels of cultural imagination. And like Wilson, they regard 
evolutionary biology as the pivotal discipline uniting the hard 
sciences with the social sciences and the humanities. They believe 
that humans have evolved in an adaptive relation to their 
environment. They argue that for humans, as for all other species, 
evolution has shaped the anatomical, physiological, and 
neurological characteristics of the species, and they think that 
human behavior, feeling, and thought are fundamentally 
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constrained and informed by those characteristics. They make it 
their business to consult evolutionary biology and evolutionary 
social science in order to determine what those characteristics are, 
and they bring that information to bear on their understanding of 
the human imagination.108 
This theoretical reorientation aims at bringing “literature itself within the field of 
cognitive and behavioural features susceptible to an adaptationist understanding.”109 
Proceeding from the recognition of the biologically and evolutionarily constrained 
human nature as a source and subject of literature, the Darwinist critics seek to 
understand the structures, functions and forms of literature. The turn to the findings 
of evolutionary psychology  leads to the creation of a theoretical feedback loop: 
studying the evolved mind can increase our knowledge of literature, and at the same 
time studying literature can improve our understanding of the evolved mind, a 
premise not dissimilar to that guiding other schools of psychology-oriented criticism, 
seeking to “build a foundation for literary studies in a systematic […] 
psychology.”110 
In the most general terms the object of Darwinian Literary Studies is to 
employ adaptationist thinking to “understand what literature is, what its functions 
are, and how it works – what it represent, what causes people to produce it and 
consume it, and why it takes the form it does.”111  Carroll identifies six major and 
sometimes overlapping components of the field: general programmatic manifestos, 
commentaries on the relation between it and the neighbouring fields of ecocriticism 
and cognitive rhetoric, discussions about the adaptive function of literature, 
discussions on topics of literary theory, critiques of specific works and broad studies 
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employing empirical and statistical methods, admitting that only the first category 
seems to be sufficiently developed.112   
Nonetheless, the results of literary research conducted along the lines drawn 
by Carroll are certainly intriguing and while it would be counter-productive to 
present them here in bulk, a few notable examples should be mentioned if only for 
illustrative purposes. The first book-length example is Brett Cooke's 2002 Human 
Nature in utopia: Zamyatin's We in which Cooke delineates the features of human 
nature, using evolutionary psychology as the basis, and proceeds to show how these 
are violated in the dystopian narrative. Jonathan Gottschall's The Rape of Troy: 
Evolution, Violence and the World of Homer (2008) traces the sociobiological 
conditioning as the motivating forces of Homer's works. The anthology Literary 
Animal (2005) includes, among others, papers by Robin Fox who discusses the 
evolutionary grounds for the male bonding mechanics presented in epics and by 
Robin Dunbar who analyses the cast structures of Shakespeare's plays and proceeds 
to link the limitations of both the cast size and the number of characters on stage at 
any given moment to his own research on the human cognitive limits of tracing inter-
personal interactions. 
Interesting though the above-mentioned analyses might be, it is difficult not 
to agree with Frederick Crews that their “results belong to aesthetics, psychology, 
and anthropology, but not, as Carroll acknowledges, to literary criticism, because the 
goal here is data extraction and replicable social-scientific knowledge rather than 
identification and explanation of the features that set a given work apart from 
others”113 and that “[t]he subject matter of literary study is not human nature; it is 
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literature.”114 Crews himself is a staunch critic of post-structuralist tendencies and an 
advocate of a rigorous, disciplined approach to studying texts. He points out the 
possibility that the seemingly anti-dogmatic and open-ended Darwinian study of 
literature may fall into precisely the same groove in which textual evidence is chosen 
and discarded at will, in order to accommodate the results of analysis to a priori 
conclusions, pre-determined by the researcher on the grounds of their loyalty to the 
Darwinian paradigm. In other words, Crews warns against a seemingly liberating 
analytical heuristics becoming a closed, jargon-filled and hypocritical hegemony 
based on and derived from premises different to those of Theory, but ultimately  
strategically identical with it. 
A serious concern has to be raised about the summary rejection of all literary 
theory which does not explicitly recognise or take into account the evolutionary 
agenda. As evidenced by Carroll's remarks quoted earlier, the Darwinists tend to 
assume a “with us or against us” attitude which leads to rewriting much of already-
established theoretical principles (such as those concerning the functions of 
literature, discussed in the subsequent chapter) without acknowledging thinkers and 
scholars reaching similar conclusions not overtly set within the evolutionary 
paradigm. It is a serious strategic mistake, because it hinders both the location of 
Darwinian literary study in a critical context, which unnecessarily complicates 
research, and excludes the possibility of meaningful critical dialogue, often because 
of emotional rather than scientific reasons.  Of course, dialogue and discussion are 
not the central objectives of Carroll's and Boyd's paradigmatic manifestos, yet it has 
to be recognised, that while consilience is not exactly conciliation, a valid critical 
enterprise should not close itself off in such a militant and often condescending 
                                                          
114 Crews, “Apriorism for Empiricists,” p. 156. 
49 
 
manner, particularly if it is rooted in the criticism of other schools precisely for that 
very reason. 
 As pointed out earlier, evolutionary psychology is far from being an 
uncontroversial branch of knowledge. Recognising its limitations, Darwinian literary 
critics disassociate from the model of massive modularity and appear to favour a 
model of human psyche which is much less constrained by the biological 
ramifications and assumes a more fluent structure of the mind. This view 
presupposes that the EEA has been an unstable and ecologically diverse habitat in 
which it would be impossible to rely on domain-specific mechanisms. As the 
anthropologist William Irons observes “general mechanisms are better at dealing 
with novelty.”115 What necessarily follows is the recognition of human behavioural 
flexibility as a result of adaptation to this changing and unstable past environment. 
Arguing in favour of this approach, Rick Potts writes: 
There appears to have been a succession of evolved mechanisms 
that amplified the adaptive flexibility of certain hominid taxa over 
time […] Pliocene locomotor versatility was succeeded in the early 
Pleistocene by an expansion of dietary possibilities, habitat 
diversity, and distances of movement. These means of adaptive 
flexibility were heightened as relative brain size increased during 
the middle Pleistocene. In still later populations, new means of 
behavioral flexibility were manifested, including complex symbolic 
coding, more rapid and spatially diverse technological innovation, 
and powerfully coordinated social action such as bone architectural 
feats and long-distance trading. These new possibilities represented 
an unprecedented degree of behavioral versatility, and were 
expressed after several hundred thousand years of intense habitat 
change.116   
Embracing this position allows Darwinian critics to evade accusation of over-
insistence on the modular view of the mind and thus of extreme adaptationism and  
to account for the seemingly unlimited variety of human behaviours and cultural 
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activity117 by inscribing them within the context of the evolved behavioural 
flexibility. 118 
With these reservations in mind, we can observe that what ultimately emerges 
is a theoretical paradigm in which it is possible to understand humans for what they 
are: exceptional products of Nature, in many ways inimical to it, and in many ways 
able to exceed their evolutionary limitations, but in all cases working, acting, 
thinking, feeling and perceiving with and through the evolved biological apparatus. If 
not all human behaviour is adaptive, and if not all of it contributes to increasing 
fitness, all of it is, at certain, sometimes very deep, levels, shaped and influenced by 
the human evolutionary heritage. The Cartesian dichotomy of mind and body 
becomes irrelevant. Nature and nurture cease to be oppositions and become 
complementary. Man is firmly embodied  and it is this embodiment which allows to 
explain how the immaterial,  the linguistic, the affective and the ideational arise and 
are organised.  
 
The Adaptive Function of Art 
 
To do so it is necessary to proceed from the evolutionary attempts at explaining the 
function of art in general, which fall into two groups: those which consider art to be 
an adaptation, that is  a fitness-enhancing trait developed through sexual or natural 
selection, and thus showing a clear function as well as a complex design toward 
performing this function; and those which do not consider art to be an adaptation but 
rather see it as a product (or a by-product) of the evolved human mind. The ultimate 
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solution to the question is a matter to be settled by evolutionary psychologists and 
thus it is not genuinely central to the present discussion, however a brief review of 
those positions is in order. 
The earliest (and brief) evolutionary remarks on the origin and function of art 
come from Charles Darwin and are derived from his theory of sexual selection. 
Darwin noted that certain ornamental features displayed by males would render 
individuals more conspicuous and thus less likely to avoid predators, seemingly 
contradicting the theory of natural selection. In order to account for this apparent 
aberration, Darwin proposed that the ornaments would serve to increase the male's 
attractiveness to  females, increasing their reproductory chances and thus adding to 
the general fitness.119 Darwin tentatively noted that in humans “high cost, apparent 
uselessness, and manifest beauty usually indicated that a behaviour had a hidden 
courtship function”120 and proposed that music developed as a means of “charming 
the opposite sex.”121  
The most prominent contemporary proponent of the theory of art as sexually 
selected is Geoffrey Miller who argues that among humans, much like among other 
species, "[s]ome males have higher fitness than other males, and they advertise their 
fitness using fitness indicators such as vigorous dancing, intelligent conversing, or 
realistic cave-painting."122 Miller overlooks the fact, that should art serve merely a 
sexual selection function it would have been an exclusively male phenomenon, 
practised by males since puberty into early maturity, up to the point of successful 
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mate selection. Afterwards it would be unnecessary for males to display their 
fitness.123  
If Miller's theory is dismissive of the social dimension of both selection and 
art, focusing solely on mating interactions, Ellen Dissanayake's views of art stress the 
importance of its role in promoting social cohesion. In her first two books, What Is 
Art For? (1988)124 and Homo Aestheticus (1992)125, Dissanayake makes a number of 
interesting claims. She recognizes art as being a time and energy consuming activity 
which induces strong emotions (including pleasure) universally across all human 
societies. She also points out that contemporary Western art is not the most 
convenient place to start thinking of art in biological terms. Dissanayake argues that 
because of its tradition of art-for-art's sake, existent since the eighteenth century, 
Western art is heavily non-functional which makes it detached from the original 
conditions in which art emerged. Most importantly, however, Dissanayake puts 
forward a theory that art consists of “making special” those objects and activities that 
are of greatest importance for humans (such as birth, courting, tools etc.). Making 
these pleasurable or otherwise appealing guarantees that they receive the necessary 
attention, which is obviously beneficial. An objection to this proposition stems from 
the fact that many objects of great importance, such as ploughs for instance, are 
almost never artified  while others, such as hand-axes, are of such critical importance 
that their artification  does not matter as they continue to be used regardless of 
whether they are adorned in some way or not.126   
Dissanayake's third book, Art and Intimacy: How the Arts Began (2000) 
presents a reformulated theory. In it, Dissanayake focuses on the communal aspect of 
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“making special.” She argues that common participation in apparently useless 
activities ensures the commitment of the group members to the group and serves to 
cement group cohesion. Religious rituals and other group ceremonies are costly 
because they require  significant amounts of time and energy to prepare and perform, 
yet seemingly  offer little in terms of immediate payoff. On the other hand, high-cost 
signals of that type are difficult to falsify. Through participating in them, an 
individual proves their loyalty and, as research shows, groups which engage in 
improving their cohesion by costly rituals have an advantage over groups which do 
not.127  
Dissanayake is certainly correct in identifying the profound role art, 
especially in its religious and ritualistic incarnations, plays in increasing social 
cohesion.  However, the social effects of art are insufficient to explain art's origin. 
Ceremonies and rituals are already dependent on a variety of more basic artistic 
endeavours not directly involved in enforcing social cohesion. What is more, art also 
exists in forms which are related more closely to play than to ritual. 128 Of course 
these objections do not entirely invalidate Dissanayake's claims. The improvement of 
social cohesion through shared artistic traditions, developed through common 
attention, might be, much like sexual selection stressed by Miller, one of the 
elements sustaining art's existence and one of the forces driving art's development. 
 
The Evolutionary Importance of Fiction 
 
In his 1984 paper titled  "Evolutionary Epistemology" Karl Popper argued that the 
human capacity to know and learn is the result of natural selection and that the 
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process of acquiring knowledge is in itself selective.129 From this perspective two 
conclusions follow. Firstly, that the purpose of learning is to prepare an individual to 
cope with the central problem of  uncertainty brought about by the endless changes 
in and of the world. Conrad Waddington formulated the problem in terms of 
“unknown future”: 
the systematic exploration of the evolutionary strategies in facing 
an unknown, but usually not wholly unforecastable, future would 
take us into a realm of thought which is the most challenging and 
very characteristic of the basic problems of biology. The main issue 
in evolution is how populations deal with unknown futures.130 
The solution to that problem is of course learning, the acquisition of information and 
knowledge necessary to survive. In 1965 Lorenz noted that “[t]he amazing and 
never-to-be-forgotten fact is that learning does, in the majority of cases, increase the 
survival value of the behaviour mechanisms which it modifies.”131 Secondly,  in 
order to be successful, knowledge must be gained relatively quickly and efficiently, 
certainly within an individual's lifespan. This premise brings with itself another 
problem outlined by Henry Plotkin thus: 
if any and every form of learning, of knowledge gain, has evolved 
as an adaptive solution to Waddington’s unknown futures problem, 
then it is a requirement that the process operate on a time scale 
much reduced from that of the main evolutionary programme 
which has given rise to it. Learning must be fast and frugal, to use 
the biologist Gerd Gigerenzer’s phrase. But how can learning be 
fast and frugal if the number of potential forms of knowledge is 
“enormous if not infinite”? […] If learning occurred by way of the 
chance sampling and matching of all possible combinations of 
sensory input, then it would be, on average, a very slow, fumbling 
and inefficient process. It would not achieve the teleological results 
that were the reason for its original evolution.132 
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Lorenz locates the answer to this problem in individuals having innate, instinctual 
knowledge of what they need to learn, a form of Kantian a priori. Furthermore, here 
in a split with Kant, Lorenz argues that the acquisition of proper knowledge through 
the senses is certainly possible. He asks: ”is it at all probable that the laws of our 
cognitive apparatus should be disconnected with those of the real world?”133 and 
answers “no.” Human cognitive apparatus must be supplying humans with accurate 
and reliable information because not doing so would be counter-adaptive and would 
have caused our extinction a long time ago. If the shape of the human eye, or the 
shape of the human brain have been selected for, they must be working adequately 
well. 
The second point raised by Popper concerns the selective nature of 
knowledge  and science. According to Popper “the growth of our knowledge is the 
result of a process closely resembling what Darwin called 'natural selection'; that is 
the natural selection of hypotheses: our knowledge consists, at every moment, of 
those hypotheses which have shown their (comparative) fitness by surviving so far in 
their struggle for existence; a competitive struggle which eliminates those hypotheses 
which are unfit.”134 Thus, according to evolutionary epistemology, learning is 
possible, necessary, governed by the principle of natural selection and to be most 
effective it should happen quickly. However, biological evolution alone would not be 
able to keep pace with human cultural evolution and would not be able to provide the 
homo sapiens with currently relevant innate knowledge of what is to be learned about 
the world in which profound changes can occur much faster than it is necessary for 
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biological evolution to occur. Nor would the process of trial and error learning be 
effective in the highly complex human social environments, because of the terminal 
dangers involved in making wrong judgements.  
It is at this juncture that art, and particularly fiction, reappears in the 
discussion. In “Does Beauty Build Adapted Minds? Toward an Evolutionary Theory 
of Aesthetics, Fiction and Arts” (2001) John Tooby and Leda Cosmides present a 
number of arguments which support their main claim of art, and especially fiction, 
being an adaptation the main function of which is mental organization. As humans 
are endowed with great mental capacity for both storing information and for 
computing it, they have to posses the ability to deal with information that might be 
true, used to be true, may be true in the future, is true only in certain situations, 
someone believes to be true etc. Tooby's and Cosmides' claim is that fiction is the 
means through which the mind develops its capacity to perform this type of counter-
factual reasoning.135  
Tooby and Cosmides recognise that art is a “species-typical phenomenon”136 
and that for humans it is “an intrinsically rewarding activity, without apparent 
utilitarian profit.”137 They also argue that humans exhibit evidence of evolved 
cognitive design for engaging in and coping with fiction in their ability to efficiently 
and effortlessly decouple fictional information from factual information so that the 
fictional does not corrupt or interfere with our knowledge stores, the fictional input 
retained separately for possible future use. The existence of the specialized 
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decoupling mechanisms testifies to the fact that engaging in fiction is advantageous 
and thus adaptive.138    
Moreover, the fact that humans should display a preference for engaging in 
fictitious activities, where it would seemingly be more beneficial to seek out accurate 
information and reject  the fictional, is evidence of functional design. Tooby and 
Cosmides note with some amusement that the “appetite for the true” model fails 
when applied to humans, who consistently remain “intensely interested in 
communications explicitly marked as false.”139 In the case of imaginative fiction 
such as fantasy or science fiction the falseness itself might be the principal attractor. 
The “appetite for the true” or accurate information remains in force, however, when 
dealing with information intended as truthful. The conclusion is that “the switching 
off of an aversion to falsehood under predictable circumstances is an element that has 
seemingly been added to the human cognitive architecture.”140   
Approaching the issue from a non-adaptive perspective, Stephen Pinker, 
somewhat trivially perhaps, relies on the metaphor of "cheesecake for the mind" 
when discussing art's function. He recognizes that within the human brain there are 
evolved motivational mechanisms which give the sensation of pleasure, usually 
correlated  with attaining a fitness increment (safety, sex, esteem etc.) and goal-
achieving mechanisms which compel the mind to seek out ways of delivering 
enjoyment to the pleasure circuits of the brain.141 Thus art becomes a means of 
providing the mind with pleasurable stimuli without the trouble of actually obtaining 
the fitness increments; it becomes a form of pleasure technology, or "cheesecake," 
which allows the mind to "enjoy [...] hallucinations like exploring interesting 
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territories, conquering enemies [...] and winning attractive mates."142 The conclusion 
is that human cognitive preferences did not evolve for art but are appealed to in it 
leads Pinker to surmise that art is not adaptive. 
In his treatment of art as a by-product and a pleasure technology, Pinker 
makes a notable exception for fiction and the narrative to which he ascribes an 
adaptive role. He argues that intelligent systems, such as the human brain, benefit 
from reasoning through experiment. As generic strategies for success are fairly 
useless when applied to complex real-life problems, the most useful and instructive 
information is stored in highly detailed concrete scenarios. The scenario, along with 
its outcome is stored in memory and when the reasoner is faced with a problem, they 
search the memory for the scenario most reminiscent of the one encountered (case-
based reasoning). Thus fiction, according to Pinker: 
would be a kind of thought experiment, in which agents are 
allowed to play out plausible interactions in a more-or-less lawful 
virtual world, and an audience can take mental notes of the results. 
Human social life would be a ripe domain for this experiment-
driven learning because the combinatorial possibilities in which 
their goals may coincide and conflict […] are so staggeringly vast 
as to preclude strategies for success in life being either built-in 
innately or learnable from one's own limited personal 
experience.143  
As fictitious plots are both cheap and abundant, they can provide valuable and 
numerous insights into a variety of possible human interactions. Fiction, as per 
Pinker, providing the grounds for testing and playing out possible scenarios, would 
increase the human capacity to learn about the world, supplementing the once-
dominant capacity to learn through personal experience. 
The thought experiment aspect of fiction was scrutinized by Peter Swirski in 
Of Literature and Knowledge where the author discusses the potential of fictional 
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stories to generate nonfictional knowledge thanks to “their capacity for doing what 
philosophy and science do – generating thought experiments.”144 Swirski draws 
attention away from the aesthetic qualities of literature and toward studying it as an 
instrument of inquiry and argues persuasively in favour of treating it similarly to the 
way thought experiments are treated in philosophy and the sciences, that is as a 
valuable learning tool. Swirski elaborates on Roy Sorensen's concept of “gradualistic 
metaphilosophy,” a contention that thought experiments in philosophy are 
continuous with thought experiments in science and that there is, therefore, a 
continuity between the two disciplines.  Moreover Sorensen concludes that “thought 
experiments are stories”145 to which  Swirski adds that the point extends to literature 
and that thought experiments in literature lie on the same continuum with the obvious 
reservation that not all stories are thought experiments. Similar views were voiced by 
Alexander Argyros in “Narrative and Chaos” where he claims that a work of fiction 
may be considered “a hypothesis about the nature of the existing slice of reality or 
about the potential consequences of certain variations on a model of the world”146 
and can even be used to perform experiments on the reality which it models. 
For E.O. Wilson art is exactly the means by which humans can cope with the 
vastness of possibilities brought about by their evolved intelligence.147 Carroll agrees 
with this functional approach, adding that in creating models or images of people 
acting in the world, and imbuing them with emotion and moral value, literature 
creates general psychological maps used by readers to assess their behaviour and its 
alternatives.148 This point translates directly into the relationship between 
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epistemology and fiction which is cheap, abundant, easily accessed, quickly 
assimilated and infinitely flexible, which in turn enables it to respond to the 
numerous possible situational combinations that can be encountered in the world 
much more easily and at a lower cost than other forms of learning. 
 In this sense, literature functions as a cultural repository of what Friedrich 
Hayek called “dispersed knowledge,” a notion derived from his analysis of the free 
market system in which each of the participants possesses only a fraction of the 
knowledge of the total system, and yet is able to act rationally and effectively. This is 
made possible by the analysis of price variation, which supplies the market 
participant with enough information to decide a rational course of action.149 Outside 
of the market system, in social and cultural spheres, the indicative function of the 
price mechanism, reflecting the dispersed, economic insights of large numbers of 
individuals, is performed by traditional conventions and norms of behaviour against 
which courses of action are decided and evaluated.150 The injunctions of tradition 
need not be followed. Their existence in the dispersed form is sufficient for a tacit 
framework of cultural, social and moral reference to exist and aid in planning 
actions. Fictional plots can greatly increase this reference pool, particularly because 
they open access to a range of speculation much broader than the limits of any given 
individual’s personal experience. 
 
Science Fiction  
 
The focus on “unknown future” as the object of inquiry and scenario testing as the 
means of it, leaves little doubt that science fiction is a privileged type of writing in 
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this paradigm.  While other types of fiction can fall anywhere on the spectrum of 
their epistemological usefulness, varying from genre to genre and even from one 
reader to another, possibly serving no function other than being pleasurable, science 
fiction makes its role clear. The assertion follows naturally from the definitions of 
the genre. For Darko Suvin, science fiction is a mode “whose necessary and 
sufficient conditions are the presence and interaction of estrangement and cognition, 
and whose main formal device is an imaginative framework alternative to the 
author's empirical environment.151 Suvin points out that the “alternative framework” 
must remain possible, constrained by logical principles, which even if imaginary and 
ruled out by science as we know it, must adhere to a certain causal rationality. Suvin 
proposes that the term “novum” be used to refer to the element of estrangement 
introduced in science fiction and thus the mode of writing becomes one in which the 
novum is foregrounded as a particular epistemological problem, the subject of 
speculation and the object of the cognitive experiment and by necessity it is 
“postulated on and validated by the post-Cartesian and post-Baconian scientific 
method.”152 
Gwyneth Jones' description of science fiction and its modus operandi is very 
similar to Pinker's general description of fiction's function. Jones writes: 
whatever phenomenon or speculation is treated in [science] fiction, 
there is a claim that it is going to be studied to some extent 
scientifically – that is objectively, rigorously; in a controlled 
environment. The business of the writer is to set up the equipment 
in a laboratory of the mind such that the “what if” in question is at 
once isolated and provided with the exact nutrients it needs.153 
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The stressing of the rigorousness of the “cognitive logic”154 with which the novum is 
to be approached is a further testimony to the epistemological role of science fiction, 
directly derivative from Pinker's definition and his insistence that fiction plays out its 
possible scenarios in a “more-or-less lawful virtual world.” To retain its value, a 
fictitious plot must take place within the limits of a non-arbitrary virtual reality, in 
the case of science fiction delineated either by a speculated science of pseudo-
science which, regardless of the level of its “pseudosness,” must obey the rules of its 
own game, that is, the rules of the scientific method or otherwise lose its relevance. 
It is so, because while cultural activity is enabled by biological dispositions, 
it, in turn, can affect these dispositions through what John Odling-Smee, Kevin 
Laland and Marcus Feldman call “self-induced selection pressures.”155 These arise 
when organisms actively engage with their surroundings in the process of niche 
construction and “choose their own habitats, mates, and resources and construct 
important components of their local environments such as nests, holes, burrows, 
paths, webs, dams, and chemical environments.”156 Or skyscrapers and cars – the 
mechanism is readily apparent in humans and applicable to cultural artefacts, 
although on a scale and at a velocity much greater than in the case of earthworms or 
moles. Indeed, what the human race is witnessing is the explosive creation of cultural 
niches and the proliferation of self-induced pressures. From Post-It notes, through the 
Tzar Bomb to the World Wide Web, the twentieth century alone brought with itself 
so much advancement and so many threats, actual, possible and imagined, opened so 
many doors leading to unknown places, sometimes very literally, as evidenced by the 
exploration of the oceanic abyss or the void of space, that the emergence of a 
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phenomenon which would allow to probe into the unknown futures, openly and 
explicitly, can be considered an evolutionary necessity, given that, as Jerome Bruner 
put it, “we organize our experience […] mainly in the form of narrative.”157 Science 
fiction is thus a necessary response to the proliferation of cognitive problems brought 
about by technological and social change. 
To that effect, the science fiction nova, the elements of otherness constituting 
the central formal devices of science fiction texts, usually come from a fairly limited 
set of categories, derived from and relevant to either  the present, the projected or the 
speculated technological achievements of humanity such as interstellar travel and 
alien species of the “Golden Age of Science Fiction” for the Space Age, interacting 
with robots or other forms of advanced technology, computers and virtual reality of 
cyberpunk for the Information Age, or genetically modified and transformed humans 
for the present age, expressed in a cyberpunk derivative referred to as “biopunk.” 
Once the speculated element of novelty appears in the real world, it will have been 
already narrated, already explored and already mentally experimented on and thus, in 
the words of John Huntington, science fiction “manages to domesticate the future, to 
render it habitable and, in spite of a somewhat strange surface, basically familiar.”158 
Patrick Parrinder, similarly argues that “[a] fiction that is estranged in Suvin's terms 
may, however, make us feel at home in a particular future provided that it offers a 
new angle of perception and so familiarizes us with a different view of the 
present. […] Estranged fiction needs to change our view of our condition.”159 
When “the future happens” it is already known. As Adam Robert argues: 
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The symbolic purchase of SF on contemporary living is so 
powerful, and speaks so directly to the realities of our accelerated 
culture, that it provides many of the conceptual templates of the 
modern Western world. The complex debates surrounding the 
genetic engineering of foodstuffs, for instance, enter popular 
consciousness in SF terms as ‘Frankenstein foods’. The dangers of 
asteroid impact on our world find expression in such SF texts as the 
films Deep Impact (1997) and Armageddon (1998). Our feelings 
about computers have been rehearsed by every SF text that includes 
Artificial Intelligence; actual exploration of our solar system seems 
tame to us because our expectations have been raised by the thrills 
of the SF imagery; many people regard the trope of UFO 
abductions to be fact rather than science fiction, partly because of 
the expertness of SF texts such as The X-Files. As Istvan Csicsery-
Ronay Jr puts it, ‘SF has ceased to be a genre per se, becoming 
instead a mode of awareness about the world’ (Csicsery-
Ronay1991:308). SF does not project us into the future; it relates to 
us stories about our present, and more importantly about the past 
that has led to the present.160 
In short, science fiction is, at least to an extent, certainly a mode of writing in which 
a subject is repeatedly and perpetually (and purposefully) made to try and make 
sense of the world, try and find itself in it and – most importantly – try and survive in 
it. Thus science fiction is charged with an epistemological function and it is not 
entirely correct to focus solely on the ontological character of science fiction, a 
practice apparently favoured by post-structuralist critics. 
In Constructing Postmodernism (1992) Brian McHale develops an interesting 
history of science fiction in which he recognizes that each of the genre's consecutive 
oscillations, from the Golden Age, through New Wave to cyberpunk is marked by an 
“ever closer aesthetic contemporaneity”161 to mainstream postmodern fiction. 
McHale speaks of a “peculiar relationship of nonsychronization between SF and 
advanced mainstream fiction […] with each reflecting an outdated phase of the 
other,”162 that is the 1950s authors imitating the best-seller techniques, the New 
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Wave writers turning to literary modernism and postmodern writers such as Pynchon 
and Burroughs borrowing from pulp science fiction. For McHale the two 
unsynchronised modes ultimately  “meshed to create a science-fictionized 
mainstream and postmodernized SF distilled in cyberpunk.”163The discussion leads 
McHale to conclude that 
my conviction has grown that  SF, far from being marginal to 
contemporary "advanced"  or "state-of-the-art" writing, may 
actually be paradigmatic of it. This is so in at least two respects. 
First, SF is openly and avowedly ontological in its orientation, i.e., 
like "mainstream" postmodernist writing it is self-consciously 
world-building fiction, laying bare the process of world-making 
itself. Secondly, SF constitutes a particularly clear and 
demonstrable example of an intertextual field, one in which 
models, materials, images, "ideas," etc. circulate openly from text 
to text, and are conspicuously  cited, analyzed, combined, revised, 
and reconfigured. In this it differs from 
"mainstream"postmodernism only in the openness and visibility of 
the process. It is precisely this visibility of intertextual circulation 
in SF that makes it so valuable as a heuristic model of literature in 
general, and postmodernist literature in particular.164 
He contrasts modernist fiction and its focus on the  relatively centred subject trying 
to wind its way through reality in search of truth (the epitome of which is detective 
fiction) with the postmodern “ontological dominant” of the fragmented subject 
exposed to the multiverse of experience as a defining feature of science fiction: 
While epistemologically-oriented fiction (modernism, detective 
fiction) is preoccupied with questions such as: what is there to 
know about the world? and who knows it, and how reliably? How 
is knowledge transmitted, to whom, and how reliably?, etc., 
ontologically-oriented fiction (postmodernism, SF) is preoccupied 
with questions such as: what is a world? How is a world 
constituted? Are there alternative worlds, and if so, how are they 
constituted? How do different worlds, and different kinds of world, 
differ, and what happens when one passes from one world to 
another, etc.?165 
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However, as Istvan Csicsery-Ronay correctly notes, McHale makes a serious 
omission in equating cyberpunk science fiction with the ontological chaos of 
postmodernity: 
Behind and within all the worlds-within-and-alongside-worlds, 
experiences, identities, and conditions of existence that are neither 
life nor death, there is a continuum which determines the relative 
importance of the thematic elements: namely, the history of 
technology. Technology's almost autonomous force, distributed 
through machines, drugs, bionics, cyborgs etc., saturates cyberpunk 
and indeed most SF – to a degree that it demands to be viewed as a 
driving principle overriding all other lesser powers. If there is a 
thematic dominant in cyberpunk (and perhaps SF in general) it is 
technology, for it is the concrete, unguided and global 
transformative power of technology that inspires the widespread 
concern with worlds in contemporary culture which McHale calls 
ontological. Technology, however unlike ontology, has a material 
social history that both determines and is determined by other 
cultural practices it can be socially and politically unconscious, 
even in art. It can be suffered, comprehended, contested, joined, 
and even avoided [...]. It is a ground for fiction. 166 
 
Thus, considering science fiction in terms of pure aesthetics or poetics proves 
insufficient and inadequate and leads McHale astray. While Csicsery-Ronay's 
argument is certainly correct, there seems to be another crucial point which McHale's 
discussion of science fiction is unable not only to address but to recognise, namely 
the question of science fiction's purpose. The remarks about the nonsynchronised 
aesthetics of science fiction (which are correct) overshadow an important fact that 
thematically the dominant currents of science fiction are synchronised with their 
cultural and technological context, which is not surprising as their function is to 
address challenges as they appear. Hence, to speak of science fiction solely in terms 
of ontology is a mistake, an incomplete account which can be readily supplemented 
by the epistemological considerations derived from evolutionary theory. If the tactics 
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of science fiction are ontological, the underlying general strategy definitely has an 
epistemological dimension. 
It has to be noted, that the epistemological value of science fiction is retained 
even in those cases when the mechanism of scenario testing is quite inaccurate. Even 
though very few of science fiction’s predictions have actually come true in the form 
they were first postulated, the accuracy of the actualisation is not important. It is the 
process itself that matters and its value is independent of any stipulated correctness 
of a science fiction proposition. The explanation for this is linked to John Dewey’s 
idea of collateral learning. In Experience and Ecudation  Dewey writes: 
Collateral learning in the way of formation of enduring attitudes, of 
likes and dislikes, may be and often is much more important than 
the spelling lesson or lesson in geography or history that is 
learned.  For these attitudes are fundamentally what count in the 
future.  The most important attitude that can be formed is that of 
desire to go on learning.167 
For science fiction the attitudinal enhancement will affect not only learning, but the 
very idea of coming into contact with difference, strangeness and otherness implicit 
in the notion of an unknown future. The mechanism which enables such attitude 
enhancement is the “mere exposure effect.” 
 In a 1968 paper “Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure,” Robert B. Zajonc 
observed that 
[t]he first encounter with the novel stimulus produces fear reaction. 
If no negative consequences are associated with this first encounter, 
the avoidance reaction upon the second encounter will naturally be 
weaker. If such encounters continue, and if no other events – 
negative in their consequences for the organism – accompany these 
encounters, then the organism’s attitude toward the stimulus must 
improve. The exposure of a stimulus coupled with reward will 
strengthen the animal’s approach behaviour; and the exposure of 
stimulus coupled with a noxious event will strengthen his 
avoidance reactions. But in the absence of reward or punishment, 
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mere exposure will result in the enhancement of the organism’s 
attitude toward the given stimulus object.168 
The preference for the familiar arises because, as Eddie Harmon-Jones and John B. 
Allen argue, “new objects could present a potential threat [and] organisms that had a 
fear of the strange and unfamiliar were more likely to survive, reproduce, and pass 
on genetic material and inherited traits to subsequent generations than organisms that 
lacked the fear of novelty.”169Thus, it is “adaptive […] to prefer the familiar over the 
novel.”170 In the paradoxical case of science fiction, it is exactly the novel which 
becomes familiarised through exposure to itself. 
 Subsequent research into the phenomenon not only confirmed its occurrence 
in humans,171 but also drew attention to a number of factors which influence its 
intensity. Among these are, for instance, exposure duration, the ability to recognise 
the stimulus, and quite crucially boredom. According to Robert Bornstein, Amy Kale 
and Karen Cornell, “complex stimuli have been found to receive more positive 
ratings than simple stimuli, [since they] become boring more quickly.”172 One 
possible  evolutionary explanation of this is that “it is adaptive to grow bored with 
stimuli that, after many repeated exposures, have never been associated with any 
type of positive reinforcement. As a stimulus proves itself to be neither dangerous 
nor reinforcing, one simply loses interest in it and turns one’s attention to other 
familiar stimuli that have proved rewarding.”173 
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What this observation implies about science fiction is that, because it is 
focused on a fairly narrow set of themes and problems, the genre is at risk of 
becoming uninteresting and unrewarding, which would prevent it from performing 
its functions. In order not to become boring, science fiction relies on a number of 
narrative strategies specifically aimed at drawing attention to itself  and making itself 
interesting. These strategies are discussed in the following two chapters. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is little direct evidence to testify to science fiction’s adaptive usefulness. 
Indeed, the effect of a literary phenomenon on a species’ fitness is, quite literally, 
immeasurable. However, recent observations on popular culture seem to provide 
indirect evidence for the correctness of the above claims. 
In Everything Bad is Good for You Steven Johnson presents a set of striking 
claims which certainly go against the grain of public discourse on popular culture. 
Johnson observes, using the plot structures of police procedural series and soap 
operas as examples, that mass culture is becoming progressively more complex. 
Where an episode of Dragnet or Starsky and Hutch might have a single plot line, an 
episode of The Sopranos would have as many as nine, interacting and influencing 
one another. Rather than stupefying the viewers, the shows in question become more 
and more engaging and require more and more attention to follow the multiple plot 
strands. Similarly, some computer games (role-playing games, grand strategy games 
and adventure games in particular) reach levels of complexity previously 
unimaginable and engaging the players in cycles of “probing, hypothesising, 
reprobing and rethinking” thus compelling them to operate and interact with the 
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games’ environments according to the fundamentals of the scientific method. The 
viewers and gamers react to these complex structures enthusiastically. Rather than 
shy away from the challenge that these cultural artefacts are, the audiences devote 
their attention, time and creativity to solving puzzles, predicting possible story 
outcomes and discussing their particular intricacies on numerous websites and 
message boards. 
Johnson tentatively links the phenomenon of increasing complexity with the 
Flynn Effect, an observable increase in the average IQ level and goes farther to say: 
When cinema first became a mainstream diversion in the early 
1900s, the minds of that era were not primed to master ten new 
technologies and dozens of new genres in the next decade; they had 
to adapt to the new conventions of movie going, learning a new 
visual language, and a new kind of narrative engine. But as the new 
technologies started to roll out in shorter and shorter cycles, we 
grew more comfortable with the process of probing a new form of 
media, learning its idiosyncrasies and its distortions, its symbolic 
architecture and its rules of engagement. 
The mind adapts to adaptation. Eventually you get a generation that 
welcomes the challenge of new technologies, that embraces new 
genres with a flexibility that would have astonished the semi-
panicked audiences that trembled through the first black-and-white 
films.174 
If Johnson’s point is correct, then science fiction, conceived of in the most general 
terms,  can be understood to perform adaptively by lowering the future shock, by 
negotiating new technologies and their impact and by facilitating the development of 
cognitive skills necessary to cope with unknown (but increasingly more 
technological) futures. 
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CHAPTER 3: TO BOLDLY GO… : SCIENCE FICTION AND 
SPACIAL EXPLORATION 
 
So here we were, fifty men and fifty women, with IQs 
over 150 and bodies of unusual health and strength, 
slogging cutely through the mud and slush of central 
Missouri, reflecting on the usefulness of our skill in 
building bridges on worlds where the only fluid is an 
occasional standing pool of liquid helium. 
Joe Haldeman, The Forever War 
 
“The two things for which science fiction is best known are these: the creation of 
new environments and the evocation of the sense of wonder”175 writes Michael 
Marshall Smith in the foreword of Lost in Space. Geographies of Science Fiction 
Continuum. There is little doubt that science fiction is preoccupied with concepts and 
representations of space. This preoccupation is equally visible in the actual literary 
works and in the criticism which accompanies them. It is so because science fiction 
is capable of creating and envisaging new spaces and humans, the audience, the 
readers and the critics alike, cannot resist the urge to explore them. In this chapter I 
will argue that the generation of these new spaces as well as their shape, functions 
and perceptions are non-random, motivated and structured, partly, by the 
evolutionary framework of the human mind. This generation serves a double 
purpose: firstly and most basically, science fictional spaces serve as settings for, and 
objects of, experimentation, providing a necessarily removed background for the 
alternative paradigm to exist in. The temporal, spatial or conceptual displacement 
enables the realisation of cognitive estrangement. Secondly, these spaces can serve 
more actively as means of mapping the particular problems taken up by respective 
texts onto them, in order to facilitate comprehension and cognition. 
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These two purposes rely on the innate human interest in spaces and 
landscapes, derived from the adaptive pressures faced by early humans in the 
ancestral settings. This interest in turn, serves as a foundational element of science 
fiction poetics, an evolutionarily derived framework upon which the structures of 
meaning of science fiction ultimately rest. 
 
Science Fiction and Heterotopia 
 
Science fiction and its spaces exist in a close relationship to Michel Foucault’s 
concept of heterotopia, an “other space.” On the one hand, science fiction is firmly 
heterotopic, due to its reliance on  estrangement, which leads to narrative creation of 
spaces which, following Foucault’s definition of heterotopia, are spaces  “that have 
the curious property of being in relation with all the other sites, but in such a way as 
to suspect, neutralize or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, 
mirror or reflect”176 and in which “all the other real sites that can be found within a 
culture, are simultaneously represented, contested and inverted.”177  
Foucault makes a distinction between crisis heterotopias, that is “privileged 
or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for individuals who are, in relation to society 
and to the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis”178  and 
heterotopias of deviation, that is “those in which individuals whose behaviour is 
deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed.”179  Fiction as estranged 
as science fiction, with its alternate cognitive framework as a central element, always 
presupposes a deviation from the norm, and the presence or appearance of radical 
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alterity always causes a state of crisis both on the level of diegesis and for the reader 
confronted with it. 
Furthermore, Foucault observes that “a society, as its history unfolds, can 
make an existing heterotopia function in a very different fashion; for each 
heterotopia has a precise and determined function within a society and the same 
heterotopias can, according to the synchrony of the culture in which it occurs, have 
one function or another.”180  Even a cursory look at the history of science fiction will 
confirm that thematically  it remains closely tied to the crises of its present. The 
correspondence is not one-to-one, but it is possible to discern thematic dominants: 
the fascination with space travel before the advent and in the early stages of the 
Space Age; the permeating apocalyptic themes of Cold War science fiction; the 
speculative shift towards innerspace of the human mind dominating New Wave 
science fiction; the fascination with computers and information technologies defining 
cyberpunk. 
Yet further, heterotopias “are most often linked to slices in time – which is to 
say that they open onto what might be termed, for the sake of symmetry, 
heterochronies. The heterotopia begins to function at full capacity when men arrive 
at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time.”181  Examples provided by 
Foucault: cemeteries, museums, libraries or prisons, all offer such breaks with 
traditional time. Science fiction and its spaces are no different. In the most general 
sense, the possible futures of science fiction are perpetual: a story which is 
temporally located in the future will always take place in it, regardless of the actual, 
real-world date. An unspecified date of the diegesis (such as the “seven years from 
now” in Dick’s A Scanner Darkly) ensures this perpetuity even stronger. 
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Despite the fact that heterotopias are radical reinventions of existing orders 
they are not unstructured. To the contrary, while the rules within a given heterotopia 
may differ significantly from those outside of it, heterotopic spaces are even more 
regulated than standard spaces. The exemplary spaces provided by Foucault are all 
rigidly ordered, strictly delineated and tightly constricted. Importantly, however, in 
case of fiction, the deviating rules, the subversions of order, are often only visible to 
the reader: on the level of science fiction diegesis the physics of a spaceship in zero 
gravity or a social organisation in which polygamy is the norm rather than an 
exception are understood as normative.     
Therein lies the paradoxical relation: in order to ensure alterity, “the strange 
newness” and essential transgresiveness the subversive heterotopias of science 
fiction are often themselves subverted through “a notion of a science fictional space 
that exists parallel to the normal space of the diegesis – a rhetorically heightened 
‘other realm’.”182 To expand upon Benjamin Harshaw’s proposition in textual 
ontology, according to which the real and fictional worlds establish their own, 
parallel fields of reference the exact relation between which are mediated for the 
reader by the text, thus forming a “double decker” structure, science fiction 
establishes another field of reference, a “triple decker.”183 
 Bukatman goes as far as to call the presence of these paraspaces “endemic to 
the genre of science fiction.”184  These paraspaces serve as heterotopias of 
heterotopias, spaces in which the inverted rules invert upon themselves. Their 
presence contributes to the emergence of a pattern of world building and narrative 
structuring in which the primary heterotopic space is clearly delineated, constricted 
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or compartmentalised and needs to be breached, opened or ventured out of, into the 
secondary heterotopia of the paraspace.  
 
The Narrative Pattern of Exploration 
 
This narrative pattern is the foundation of the space-operatic and exploratory streaks 
of science fiction. Spaceships, other-world colonies and scientific outposts are the 
primary heteretopias of these sub-genres and their heterotopic character is clearly 
evident from Foucault’s formulation, which argues, pointing out the imaginative 
aspect, that 
if we think, after all, that the boat is a floating piece of space, a 
place without a place, that exists by itself, that is closed in on itself 
and at the same time is given over to the infinity of the sea and that, 
from port to port, from tack to tack, from brothel to brothel, it goes 
as far as the colonies in search of the most precious treasures they 
conceal in their gardens, you will understand why the boat has not 
only been for our civilization, from the sixteenth century until the 
present, the great instrument of economic development (I have not 
been speaking of that today), but has been simultaneously the 
greatest reserve of the imagination. The ship is the heterotopia par 
excellence. In civilizations without boats, dreams dry up, espionage 
takes the place of adventure, and the police take the place of 
pirates.185 
The alien landscapes of far-way planets and moons, all that lies outside, are the 
secondary, paraspatial heterotopic zones.  It is there, on the outside of the alternate, 
but regulated spaces, where the contact with otherness occurs and where the 
adventure of exploration takes place. The act of crossing the border of the known 
becomes crucial in enabling it to happen, and it is this act which triggers any 
potential cognitive relevance of the contact. 
Popular television shows, such as Star Trek or Dr Who, are organised around 
this pattern of exploration, with their iconic vessels, the Enterpise and the TARDIS, 
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and their „strange new worlds.” Outside the doors of the TARDIS „we might see 
anything, we could find new worlds, terrifying monsters, impossible things”186 the 
Doctor promises. Likewise, Stargate SG-1, Stargate Atlantis and Stargate Universe 
all use the premise of a primary heterotopic location (a secret military base, an 
abandoned city of ancient aliens,  or a derelict alien spaceship, respectively) as a 
starting point for interplanetary excursions which enable the heroes to encounter 
numerous alien races and their civilisations. In Battlestar Galactica, the primary 
heterotopia is the titular warship, fighting its way through enemy-occupied space. 
In military science fiction, such as Heinlein's Starship Troopers, Haldeman's 
The Forever War, or Card's Ender's Game, the heroes proceed through the primary 
heterotopias of boot camps or military academies in order to enter the secondary 
heterotopias of the battlefields. The attention moves away from exploration, but the 
fundamental pattern is retained, even accounting for the obvious differences between 
the respective novels. Where Haldeman realises the heterotopicity of his battlefields 
through the incorporation of progressively more evident time dilation effects, relying 
on mounting temporal displacement of his heroes, Card's battlefields present 
themselves to the hero as simulated exercises, with their initial parameters and 
arbitrary rules of engagement, not even recognised as actual battles until the final 
chapters of the novel.  
The narrative template is also present in computer games. Each of the five 
major instalments of the post-apocalyptic  role-playing Fallout187 series (1997-2015) 
starts with the hero character forced to leave an underground nuclear shelter, and to 
venture into the post-nuclear Wastelands which they then explore in order to 
                                                          
186 Season 2 Trailer, Dr Who (BBC One, 2005). 
187 Interplay Entertainment, Fallout (Interplay Entertainment, 1997); Black Isle Studios, Fallout 2 
(Interplay Entertainment, 1998); Bethesta Game Studios, Fallout 3 (Bethesda Softworks, 2008); 
Obsidian Entertainment, Fallout New Vegas (Bethesda Softworks, 2010); Bethesda Game Studios, 
Fallout 4 (Bethestda Softworks, 2015). 
77 
 
complete the games' quests. The shelters (Vaults) are decidedly heterotopic settings: 
closed-off, constricted spaces, suspended in time and, as each of the Vaults had been 
somehow tampered with by the government agency responsible for their construction 
(either through sabotage of vital machinery, or through pre-selecting their inhabitants 
in such ways as to create particularly stressful social conditions), offering an 
assortment of alternative models of social and technological organization. The 
outlying Wasteland, in contrast, is an absolute unknown: initially, both the player and 
their character know nothing of what can be encountered there: the mutated life 
forms and the recovering human civilization with its new models of societal and 
cultural organization has to be explored, comprehended and learned to navigate 
through in the course of the game. There exists a direct relation between exploration, 
character development and plot progression: as more of the unknown territory is 
explored, the player is given choice of how to shape their character in terms of 
physical and mental capabilities, which in turn allows them to further the game’s 
narrative. 
In Assassin’s Creed,188 a much more action-oriented game, the relation 
between subject constitution and exploration is even more literal. The object of the 
game is to regain the memories of a medieval assassin, Altair, stored in the DNA of 
his modern-day descendant Desmond. The contemporary part of the plot takes place 
in a secret, isolated research facility (a primary heterotopia) in which Desmond 
accesses and relives the memories of Altair in a virtual reality-like memory space (a 
paraspace). The exploration of this space, a recreation of Third Crusade Holy Land, 
consists of climbing and accessing vantage points (church towers or minarets) from 
which Altair learns the layout of a city he is in. Again, the more space is seen by him, 
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the more is available to be entered and the more memories are regained. The relation 
between the reconstitution of Altair’s identity and spatial exploration is direct and 
forms the crucial gameplay element for one of the most successful video game 
franchises in history. 
What the video games examples highlight, other than the intense, multi-
layered heterotopicity of science fictional spaces, is their transformative, constitutive 
or de-constitutive, capacity towards the human subject. Because they are outlying 
zones of paradigmatic subversion, the act of crossing into them becomes a liminal 
experience, and the journey through them becomes a localised and contextualised, 
rather than merely symbolic, rite of passage. In its basic form, as outlined by Victor 
Turner, the rite of passage consists of three stages: the stage of separation, in which 
the subject is removed from their fixed social or cultural point; the liminal stage, in 
which the subject passes through a zone of in-betweenness, ambiguity and 
indeterminacy, and which is effectively Foucault’s “crisis heterotopia,” and the 
reincorporation stage, in which the now-transformed subject is reincorporated into 
the cultural order.189 This succession mirrors, and to an extent explains the narrative 
pattern outlined above: because science fiction is always alternative to existing 
conceptual orders, what constitutes its normative social and cultural context is 
already heterotopic. It is in relation to this heterotopicity that the crisis heterotopia of 
the liminal zone, a “cultural realm which has few or none of the attributes of the 
past […] state,”190 is established. 
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In the examples listed so far, the liminal paraspaces were places of becoming: 
the exploring subjects established themselves as subjects in relation to the territory 
explored.  
 J.G. Ballard's spaces become surrealistically conflated with the human mind. 
The conflation follows from Ballard's realization that “the biggest developments of 
the intermediate future will take place, not on the Moon or Mars, but on Earth, and it 
is inner space, not outer, that needs to be explored.”191 By looking at mental 
processes in terms of spatiality, by mapping the inner onto the outer Ballard employs  
buildings and structures to embody a number of psychological and emotional 
tensions, contradictions and other thought processes and metaphorically uses the 
external to represent a host of psychological and moral issues, all having to do with 
what Andrzej Gasiorek calls the “unprecedented scale of twentieth century social and 
technological change.”192 
The second novel of Ballard's Four Elements Quartet, the 1962 The Drowned 
World193 is an example of how destructive spatial exploration can be. The 
apocalyptic forces in the novel are brought about by solar flares causing global 
warming, planet-wide floods and the proliferation of flora and fauna resemblant of 
the Triassic. In this hostile habitat the human race is reduced to a fraction of its 
original population, the survivors forced to live in the polar regions with scientific 
expeditions futilely trying to map the ever-changing landscape of jungles and 
lagoons. The protagonist, Dr Kerans, finds himself suffering from strange dreams of 
pulsating sun and bellowing reptiles and is shocked to find that other members of his 
scientific expedition (the detached camp being the primary heterotopic space) 
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experience the same dream. A fellow scientist, Dr Bodkin offers an explanation: as 
the environmental conditions revert to their past form, so does the human psyche 
refocus and reshift to resemble that of the past. Growing progressively detached and 
disassociated from his duties, associates and obligations, Kerans ultimately gives in 
to a rapidly developed overwhelming yearning and undertakes a doomed journey 
south, towards the mounting heat and rampant jungles (into the unknown, paraspatial 
zone). 
Kerans’ behaviour is contrasted with that of the military escort provided for 
the expedition, under the command of Col. Riggs, and a band of scavengers and 
looters led by one Strangmann. While the soldiers cling to the old ways and 
traditions and remain faithful to their mission to the end, struggling to perform the 
tasks they were charged with, thus representing humanity's ongoing struggle with the 
suddenly hostile nature, Strangmann's band adapts to the new situation, 
commandeering a ship and living off of the remains of the civilisation. It would 
appear that Kerans would/should choose one these models of behaviour, yet as the 
novel's plot unravels so does his psychological structure. His higher social functions 
shut down which is evidenced by Kerans' detachment from both his academic duties 
(rendered pointless, as the environmental changes cannot be stopped and once 
Kerans and Bodkin come to understand what is happening to their psyches there is 
nothing else to be done) and his social obligations. The more fundamental 
reproduction drive is no longer active and Kerans' sexual detachment is possibly the 
most tell-tale phenomenon here: he withdraws from his partner and apathetically 
chooses not to engage in competing for her favours against Strangmann, thus 
ultimately turning away from the most basic  of all drives, the drive to reproduce. 
And he does so not because he is incapable of successful competition, but simply 
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because there is not any point in it – earlier in the novel the reader learns that human 
fertility rates are dropping and the chance of successful reproduction is minute. 
Ultimately even the basic drive to survive and to struggle is made irrelevant by 
Kerans' suicidal trip south from which there is no hope of his returning. As the 
external landscape and environmental conditions change, Kerans' brain and mind are 
unable to make sense of the world – unsurprisingly, as they are not meant to function 
in this “Past Perfect” version of it in the first place.  
 
The Evolutionary Necessity of Exploration 
 
The ubiquity of the exploration pattern, while not absolute nor totalising, is too 
evident to be accidental. It is historically stable, is present in different media and its 
basic shape is impervious to contextual modification. It is also consistent with the 
evolutionary account of how humans interact with their environment. 
As noted, human ancestral settings  are grouped as the postulated 
Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness, the EEA,  or, as Robert Foley puts it 
“simply a code word for the accumulated effects of human evolutionary history.”194 
Despite the elusiveness of the concrete features of the EEA, it is rather obvious that 
the ability to navigate through an environment, to locate places and landmarks, and 
to be able to learn about it and to use that knowledge later confers a significant 
adaptive advantage. 
In order to secure the attainment of the knowledge of their surroundings, 
humans developed what Stephen Kaplan refers to as “concern for information,” 
which 
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is considered a basic part of the human makeup. “Concern” as it is 
used here is intended to cover a wide spectrum of human affective 
relationships. There is the motivation to seek information, to be 
“the first to know,” and to discuss it with others. There is the 
distress that comes from struggling with information that is hard to 
understand, or inappropriate for the current situation, or not what 
one expected. There is the joy of recognizing and predicting despite 
uncertainty, or using information confidently and effectively.195 
An implication of these observations is that since knowing is affective instead of 
being merely cognitive, not-knowing produces distress, and the distress, confusion 
and frustration caused by the state of not-knowing all have adaptive implications as 
they engage the motivational systems inducing the individual to learn.  The 
attainment of knowledge is pleasurable and the sense, or want, of pleasure reinforces 
the motivation to explore. This closely follows the central assumptions of 
evolutionary epistemology discussed earlier: that learning is possible and necessary 
as  it enhances fitness; but also imply that it is, in a sense, speculative, as the 
knowledge of the environment need not be immediately useful, which again 
highlights the connection of learning with, and the potential importance of fiction, 
itself a source of pleasure and knowledge (however concrete and accurate). 
 On the other hand, the drive to explore, motivated both adaptively and 
affectively, is mitigated by fear and risk avoidance. What is unseen is potentially 
dangerous in itself,196 just as is being confused at something difficult to 
comprehend.197 However, in analysing landscape preference, Kaplan made a striking 
observation that 
[t]he most preferred scenes tended to be of two kinds. They either 
contained a trail that disappeared around a bend or they depicted a 
brightly lit clearing partially obstructed from view by intervening 
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foliage. In both cases the scenes appeared to promise that more 
information could be gained by moving deeper into the depicted 
setting. This promise of additional information was tentatively 
labelled “Mystery.”198 
Thomas Herzog and Gregory Smith’s study of environmental preferences, confirms 
that the presence of mystery is positively related to landscape preference because it 
allows for “greater exploration and useful knowledge.”199  
The presence of the secondary zone of alterity ensures that the newness of the 
setting not only affects the reader, who, after all, experiences it already at the initial 
stage of heterotopicity, but that it also affects the characters of the science fiction 
story. The promise of mystery, with its temptations and threats, with its allure of 
potentiality, is thus intensified which serves to heighten estrangement and to 
stimulate cognitive engagement with the text and the alterity which it contains. 
Gordon Orians and Judith Heerwagen, in an article neighbouring Kaplan's in 
The Adapted Mind, elaborate further that an optimal landscape would have to be easy 
enough for an individual to “read” and comprehend, yet would have to be 
sufficiently rich in “Mystery” not to appear boring.200 A science fiction setting, due 
to its default alternativeness, will always provide such a landscape; it will never be 
completely known beforehand.  Yet, according to Damien Broderick, science fiction 
“is marked [...] by the foregrounding of icons and interpretative schemata from a 
collectively constituted generic “mega-text.”201 This foregrounding immediately 
allows to mark off and recognise a science fiction text for what it is, thus allowing 
for at least a partial comprehension or orientation, balancing out the unknown factors 
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so as to reach a form of cognitive equilibrium implicit in Suvin’s discussions of 
estrangement and cognition. 
A fictional environment organised around the principles of mystery, novelty 
and complexity arouses interest. It brings with itself the possibility, implicit in its 
“mystery” aspect, of being rich in what James Gibson calls “affordances”: action 
possibilities within the environment which the actor has to perceive in order to make 
their experience of the world meaningful.202 Affordances exist even when not 
perceived as they are objective features of the world. However, when perceived, 
comprehended and interpreted by the observer, they not only offer possibilities of 
action, but, as Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly argue, can become solicitations to act: 
To say that the world solicits a certain activity is to say that the 
agent feels immediately drawn to act a certain way. This is 
different from deciding to perform the activity, since in feeling 
immediately drawn to do something the subject experiences no act 
of the will. Rather, he experiences the environment calling for a 
certain way of acting, and finds himself responding to the 
solicitation.203 
According to what was argued before, for science fiction the general solicitation is to 
perform mental experimentation, regardless of the actual topical focus of a given 
text. However, because of the ubiquity of the narrative pattern of spatial exploration, 
there emerges the possibility of a reciprocal relation, in which fictional texts serve to 
reinforce the innate, evolved drive.  
Indeed, science fiction foregrounds it quite unabashedly. The opening 
narration of Star Trek, which for half a century has pledged to “boldly go where no 
man has gone before,”204 might be the most famous example of this mechanism, and 
yet, the awareness of the importance of the exploration impulse, along with the 
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recognition of the implied risk inherent in it, has been present in science fiction since 
its inception. Verne’s Professor Arronax recognised it as early as 1870 saying: “I 
want to observe the full series of these wonders gathered under the seas of our globe. 
I want to see what no man has seen yet, even if I must pay for this insatiable curiosity 
with my life!”205 
H.G. Wells’ Mr. Bedford of The First Men in the Moon is less assured in his 
determination, but during a moment of contemplation recognises the imperative drive 
and its innateness : 
Why had we come to the moon? The thing presented itself to me as 
a perplexing problem. What is this spirit in man that urges him for 
ever to depart from happiness and security, to toil, to place himself 
in danger, to risk even a reasonable certainty of death? It dawned 
upon me up there in the moon as a thing I ought always to have 
known, that man is not made simply to go about being safe and 
comfortable and well fed and amused. Almost any man, if you put 
the thing to him, not in words, but in the shape of opportunities, 
will show that he knows as much. Against his interest, against his 
happiness, he is constantly being driven to do unreasonable things. 
Some force not himself impels him, and go he must.206 
For a writer as characterised by his characters’ bravado as Robert A. Heinlein, the 
temptation of the unknown space beyond the limits of the recognisable and 
established, was a defining feature of man. In the final lines of Methuselah’s 
Children, the protagonist, Lazarus Long, declares: 
“There ought not be anything in the whole universe that man can’t 
poke his nose into – that’s the way we’re built and I assume that 
there’s some reason for it.” 
“Maybe there aren’t any reasons.”  
“Yes, maybe it’s just one colossal big joke, with no point to 
it. […] But I can tell you this, Andy, whatever the answers are, 
here’s one monkey that’s going to keep on climbing and looking 
around him to see what he can see, as long as the tree holds out.”207 
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The opening of a new space can be a monumental act, larger than a single 
individual's personal journey, possibly of species-wide importance and with cosmic 
consequences. The protagonist of Ray Bradbury's short story „The Strawberry 
Window,” a Martian colonist (the colony being another heterotopic space), realises 
this profundity. He starts with the recognition of how deep seated the drive to explore 
is: 
„I believe in Mars” he began quietly. ' I guess I believe some day  
it'll belong to us. We'll nail it down. We'll settle in. We won't turn 
tail and run. It came to me one day a year ago, right after we first 
arrived. Why did we come? I asked myself. Because, I said, 
because. It's the same year with salmon every year. The salmon 
don't know why they go where they go, but they go, anyway. Up 
rivers they don't remember, up streams, jumping waterfalls, but 
finally making it to where they propagate and die, and the whole 
thing starts again. Call it racial memory, instinct, call it nothing, but 
there it is. And here we are.208 
He realises however, that behind this seemingly irrationalthe impulse to go, there is 
the deepest possible motivation of all, the physical survival, not of an individual, a 
tribe, or a nation, but of the species itself: 
So here we are. And from Mars where? Jupiter, Neptune, Pluto, 
and on out? Right. And on out. Why? Some day the Sun will blow 
up like a leaky furnace. Boom – there goes Earth. But maybe Mars 
won't be hurt; or if Mars is hurt maybe Pluto won't be, or if Pluto's 
hurt, then where'll we be, our sons' sons, that is? […] Why, we'll be 
on some world with a number maybe; planet 6 of star system 97, 
planet 2 of system 99! So damn far off from here you need a 
nightmare to take it in! We'll be gone, do you see, gone off away 
and safe! And I thought to myself, ah, ah. So that's the reason we 
came to Mars, so that's the reason men shoot of their 
rockets. […] Let me finish; not to make money, no. Not to see the 
sights, no. Those are the lies men tell, the fancy reasons they give 
themselves. [...] But all the while, inside, something else is ticking 
along the way it ticks in salmon or whales, the way it ticks, by God, 
in the smallest microbe you want to name. And that little clock that 
ticks in everything living, you know what it says? It says get away, 
spread out, move along, keep swimming. Run to so many worlds 
and build so many towns that nothing can ever kill man. You see, 
Carrie? It’s not just us come to Mars, it’s the race, the whole darn 
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human race, depending on how we make out in our lifetime. This 
thing is so big I want to laugh. I’m so scared stiff of it.’ […] It 
matters if Man with a capital M keeps going. There’s nothing better 
than Man with a capital M in my books. I’m prejudiced, of course, 
because I’m one of the breed. But if there’s any way to get hold of 
that immortality men are always talking about, this is the way—
spread out—seed the universe. Then you got a harvest against crop 
failures anywhere down the line. No matter if Earth has famines or 
the rust comes in. You got the new wheat lifting on Venus or 
where-in-hell-ever man gets to in the next thousand years.209 
Bob then embarks on a costly enterprise of bringing all of his family's belonging's 
(the furniture, the trinkets, even the front porch of the house) in order to literally 
make himself at home on Mars, to turn it into a version of Earth, to make the 
unfamiliar space familiar and controllable. 
That such recreation of the known in the unknown is potentially dangerous is 
evidenced by Walter Miller Jr.'s A Canticle for Leibowitz. The novel repeats the 
pattern of venturing beyond the established heterotopic space, in this case the Abbey 
of the Order of Leibowitz (a pre-war engineer commited to the preservation of 
knowledge)  and equates it with the opening of conceptual or intellectual spaces of 
scientific exploration, made forbidden by the post-nuclear war anti-scientist 
sentiment. In the first part of the novel Brother Francis stumbles upon and enters a 
pre-war fallout shelter. The scene is notable for its primordiality: the entrance to the 
shelter is a hole in the ground and „holes were often inhabited.”210 Francis pokes a 
stick into it first, to make sure that no obvious danger lurks inside.  The simplicity 
(primitivism even) of that act parallels and reflects the condition of all exploratory 
efforts at this stage of the novel: the monks of the Abbey gather and collect all pre-
war memorabilia, regardless of actual value, poking in the dark as it were, in the 
hopes of re-establishing a technological civilisation in some unspecified future.  
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Francis' stab in the dark is a faithful moment as it sets of a chain of events 
leading to his journey across largely uncharted territory to meet the Pope and 
reconnect with what is left of the Church. This results in the canonisation of 
Leibowitz and the eventual rise of the Order as the leading force of scientific and 
technological progress. The gradual re-establishment of the knowledge system is 
paralleled by the gradual reconstruction of geographical links with the world outside 
the Abbey, which, in turn, is paralleled by the gradual reconstitution of political and 
economic structures.  
The trap in the attempt to recreate the old systems in new spaces is that it 
does not lead to anywhere new,  and thus it does not, in the long run, satisfy the drive 
to move on, explore and progress. Over a thousand years after Brother Francis' 
descent into the fallout shelter, the human civilisation is highly technological again, 
with extraterrestial colonies set up among the stars and yet Earth is at the brink of 
another nuclear war.  One of the monks, Joshua, attributes this to a sense of 
frustration arising from humanity having reached a state of relative comfort and the 
ensuing stagnation: 
The closer men came to perfecting for themselves a paradise, the 
more impatient they seemed to become with it, and with 
themselves as well. They made a garden of pleasure, and became 
progressively more miserable with it as it grew in richness and 
power and beauty; for then, perhaps, it was easier for them to see 
that something was missing in the garden, some tree or shrub that 
would not grow. When the world was in darkness and 
wretchedness, it could believe in perfection and yearn for it. But 
when the world became bright with reason and riches, it began to 
sense the narrowness of the needle's eye, and that rankled for a 
world no longer willing to believe or yearn.211 
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In an act of „hope for the soul and substance of Man somewhere,”212 the monks 
decide to send out their own starship, carrying the memorabilia and missionaries into 
the outlying colonies where 
 there would be no Edens found out there, they said. Yet there were 
men out there now, men who looked up to strange suns in stranger 
skies, gasped strange air, tilled strange earth. On worlds of frozen 
equatorial tundra, worlds of steaming Arctic jungle, a little like 
Earth perhaps, enough like Earth so that Man might live 
somehow,by the same sweat of his brow. They were but a handful, 
these celestial colonists of Homo loquax nonnumquam sapiens, a 
few harassed colonies of humanity that had had small help from 
Earth thus far; and now they might expect no help at all, there in 
their new non-Edens, even less like Paradise than Earth had been. 
Fortunately for them, perhaps.213 
 The cyclical character of the novel underscores the principle that the only hope for 
humanity's survival is an incessant search for new spaces and new potentialities in a 
constant escape from settling in, becoming comfortable and stagnant. 
If the range of exploration of space in A Canticle for Leibowitz was limited to 
a few fledgling human colonies, Frank Herbert's Dune cycle focuses on the entirety 
of available space, quite literally. The central element of the first novel in the cycle, 
Dune, is a successful rebellion led by Paul Atreides against the Padishah Emperor, 
the ruler of the known universe and his Empire. The Empire is an old, rigid, quasi-
feudal structure, regulated by countless customs, traditions, laws and rules. It is also 
extremely anachronistic: swords and fencing coexist with interplanetary travel and 
galaxy-wide commercial and technological companies coexist with powerful 
religious orders which rule through deliberate planting of superstition. The Empire is, 
in other words, organised along heterotopic principles. Paul himself is a wild card, 
the unpredicted result of a breeding programme whose aim was to create a Messiah, 
a being able to cross all of time and space at once.  
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While the initial rebellion is apparently successful, it soon becomes obvious 
that the removal of the Padishah's empire leads only to its replacement by the 
Atreides empire, which is just as bureaucratic and stagnant. Paul knows what the way 
out of the rigidity is, but is unwilling to take it, and the task is taken up by his son, 
Leto, who undergoes a physical transformation disfiguring him, but ensuring his near 
immortality in the process. Leto, who commands absolute powers of prescience, and 
is nearly impervious to damage (except for drowning) then proceeds to enslave 
humanity to an unprecedented degree: he becomes God-Emperor, in absolute control 
of anything that happens; he dissolves the instistutions of the old empire, supplanting 
them with his own or directly with himself. No rebellion, no act of disobedience is 
possible against him. For thousands of years all dissenting or independent impulses 
of humanity are suppressed. When Leto finally falls, his death the only thing in all of 
time which avoided predicting, humanity explodes into the universe: 
When I set out to lead humankind along my Golden Path. I 
promised them a lesson their bones would remember. I know a 
profound pattern which humans deny with their words even while 
their actions affirm it. They say they seek security and quiet, the 
condition they call peace. Even as they speak. they create the seeds 
of turmoil and violence. If they find their quiet security. they 
squirm in it. How boring they find it. Look at them now. Look at 
what they do while I record these words. Hah! I give them enduring 
eons of enforced tranquility which plods on and on despite their 
every effort to escape into chaos. Believe me, the memory of Leto's 
Peace shall abide with them forever. They will seek their quiet 
security thereafter only with extreme caution and steadfast 
preparation. 214 
For the sake of the species' survival Leto makes the ultimate sacrifice: he banishes 
himself to eons of solitude, he denies himself happiness of any form, he makes sure 
that he remains feared  and hated for all time. And yet, the scattering of humanity 
following his death results in the ultimate opening of literal and metaphorical spaces: 
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the spread of humanity causes the development of enough cultural, political and 
physical diversity to ensure its continuous survival.   
 
Conclusion 
 
There is just as much conceptual distance between poking a stick into a hole in the 
ground and orchestrating a galaxy-wide eugenic programme as there is literary 
distance between Bradbury's short story and Herbert's massive cycle of epic novels. 
However, that the writings of a Heinlein or a Ballard should rely on so similar a 
pattern of opening up a heterotopic space through the basic act of physical 
exploration into a form of the unknown paraspace, and that this pattern should so 
closely reflect and correlate with the evolutionary structures and functions of 
landscape exploration  is symptomatic. Science fiction not only draws on the 
evolutionarily seated notion that exploration is important; it perpetuates it in the form 
of an ubiquitous, meta-narrative pattern and in doing so it provides cultural 
reinforcement of a biological, adaptive impulse (which of course gave rise to the 
creation of the cultural pattern in the first place).  
 In reality, exploration, while always involving an element of risk, may prove 
to be uneventful or beneficial. In science fiction it has to lead to an encounter with 
otherness, the centrality of which has been repeatedly stressed. The following chapter 
focuses on mechanisms of creating the alien element and employing it in ways which 
enable it to become the object of cognitive attention. 
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CHAPTER 4: ALL THE STRANGE, STRANGE CREATURES: 
DISGUST AND THE SCIENCE FICTION NOVUM 
 
“I’ve been a tiger all my life. I trained myself… educated 
myself, pulled myself up by my stripes to make me a 
stronger tiger, with a longer claw and a sharper tooth… 
quick and deadly.” 
“And you are. You are. The deadliest.” 
“No. I’m not. I went too far. I went beyond simplicity. I 
turned myself into a thinking creature. I look through your 
blind eyes, my love whom I loathe, and I see myself. The 
tiger’s gone.” 
Alfred Bester, The Stars My Destination 
 
The distinguishing feature of the exploration impulse is that it is pervasively 
transgressive. The basic act of entering an unknown territory necessarily involves a 
crossing of the threshold between what is known, explored and mapped and what is 
not. The act of the crossing itself always leads the subject into a space of contingency 
and of potentiality. It is a space of uncertainty, equally fraught with danger and 
opportunity, tempting and threatening at the same time.  
In science fiction, regardless of the actual representation of the crossing, 
whether it is an actual, physical act of moving somewhere, or a more conceptual or 
figurative form of movement, the subject always enters into a different system of 
meanings, an unknown ontology, perpetually subversive of the empirically 
experienced, and perhaps expected, reality. Thus, there emerges a duality of 
transgressiveness: while the exploring subject is itself an invader, a transgressor, they 
become exposed to encounters with radical alterity occupying the space outside of 
the margins of the known: objects, beings, concepts, rules, laws and values which, by 
definition, breach or violate the established rules of established orders, be they 
scientific, political or social. These alien elements, while threatening and invasive, 
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always remain the focus of attention, interest and even fascination. Contact with the 
unknown, in the words of Istvan Csicsery-Ronay Jr. 
represents the collapse of ontological categories that reason has 
considered essentially distinct, creating a spectacle of impossible 
fusions. This is the domain of monstrous aliens, interstitial beings, 
and anomalous physical phenomena. [...] [it] is implosive, 
accompanied by fascination and horror at the prospect of intimate 
category violating phenomena discovered by human science.[...] 
This facet, one of the most powerfully attractive of the genre, 
draws its reason-based irrationality increasingly from actual 
scientific innovations that combine phenomena previously held to 
be naturally distinct (such as, for example, genetic engineering, 
molecular computing, and Artificial Life) and the constant 
weakening of category boundaries that seems to menace the sense 
of personal identity.215 
Besides the inherent dialectic of fascination and horror arising from the violating 
character of science fictional alterity, Csicsery-Ronay Jr. observes another duality 
inherent in the encountered novum: 
Each sf novum is a compound of at least two different kinds of 
radical change. The change usually first appears as a physical-
material novelty: change in the material organization of existence. 
This form is complemented by an ethical novelty: a change in 
values and mores. The genre does not dictate how the two 
dimensions will be related in a given text, only that they will be. 
Ethical themes may constrain the material novum, overdetermining 
it with symbolic qualities [...]. Or, vice versa, the material novum 
may set the conditions for the ethical, determining the possibilities 
of judgment.[...]. Many variations are possible. In sf, the physical-
material and the ethical are distinct realms, but they rub shoulders 
at the molecular level.216 
From the narrative perspective the representation of the novum is a practical 
problem. For the astrophysicist and science fiction author Gregory Benford  “[t]here 
is probably no more fundamental theme in science fiction than the alien. The genre 
reeks of the desire to embrace the strange, the exotic and unfathomable nature of the 
future. Often the science in SF represents knowledge—exploring and controlling and 
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semisafe. Aliens balance this desire for certainty with the irreducible unknown [...] 
Yet for me, the most interesting problem set by the alien is in rendering the alienness 
of it. How do you set the ineffable in a frame of scientific concreteness? This is a 
central problem for SF.”217  Benford further notes that “one cannot depict the totally 
alien,”218 or as Patrick Parrinder phrases it:  
any meaningful act of defamiliarization can only be relative, since 
it is not possible for man to imagine what is utterly alien to him. To 
give meaning to something is also, inescapably, to 'humanize' it or 
to bring it within the bounds of our anthropomorphic world view. 
This means that we can only describe something as 'alien' by 
contrast or analogy with what we already know.”219   
I wish to propose that these incongruous, binary relationships between familiarity 
and aliennes, invasive transgressiveness and attractiveness, as well as between 
materiality and ethicality, are negotiated through, governed by and built upon  the 
logic and mechanics of disgust and disgust responses  and, because of the complex 
nature of that emotion, by its correlate experience of curiosity. Disgust is the main 
mechanism protecting the body from danger inherent in the transgression of its 
boundaries and, as research shows, it operates equally powerfully in the social and 
cultural spheres.  I wish to argue that it is disgust which provides the necessary frame 
of reference against which, and through which, alienness can be rendered. To support 
this claim I will discuss the evolutionary structure of disgust as it is currently 
understood and then present how it influences the narrative patterns of science 
fiction.  
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Disgust 
 
In its physiological dimension, disgust is primarily a food rejection system. 
According to Charles Darwin “[t]he term 'disgust,' in its simplest sense, means 
something offensive to the taste. It is curious how readily this feeling is excited by 
anything unusual in the appearance, odour, or nature of our food.”220 Darwin points 
out that the food in question need not be actually rotten or otherwise harmful; it is 
enough for it to be “unusual” or “not commonly eaten”221 and that the “mere idea” of 
ingesting such food is enough to elicit disgust: no actual presence of it is required. 
Furthermore, he observes an interesting dependency: ”A smear of soup on a man's 
beard looks disgusting, though there is of course nothing disgusting in the soup itself. 
I presume that this follows from the strong association in our minds between the 
sight of food, however circumstanced, and the idea of eating it.”222 Even these early 
remarks already hint that disgust, even though based in a food-rejection response, 
can be experienced in the ideational and imaginary spheres. 
Current research supports and further develops Darwin's contentions. In their 
chapter on disgust included in the 3rd edition of the Handbook of Emotions, Paul 
Rozin, Jonathan Haidt and Clark R. McCauley propose a complex typology of 
disgust based on its biological and cultural evolution. To explain the various 
transformations and extensions of disgust they rely on the concept  of preadaptation. 
According to Ernst Mayr, preadaptation is a critically important process by means of 
which an existing evolved structure assumes “a new function without interference 
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with the original function.”223 Stephen Jay Gould and Elisabeth Vrba, while agreeing 
with the importance of the process, propose that the term “exaptation” be used to 
refer to it. They elaborate: 
We suggest that such characters, evolved for other usages (or for no 
function at all), and later coopted for their current role be called 
exaptations. They are fit for their current role, hence aptus, but they 
were not designed for it, and are therefore not ad aptus, or pushed 
towards fitness. They owe their fitness to features present for other 
reasons and are therefore fit (aptus) by reason of (ex) their form, or 
ex aptus. Adaptations have functions; exaptation have effects.224 
 
The process also operates in the developmental realm, where “[s]ystems evolved to 
handle specific problems in the world can be accessed in development to handle 
other types of problems.”225 It is this flexibility that allows the base emotion of 
disgust to operate on a number of levels, starting from the purely physiological and 
reaching well into the ethical and moral. 
The origin of all disgust is, according to Rozin, Haidt and McCauley,  “the 
rejection response to bad-tasting foods.”226 It is a basic response, present in human 
infants and mammals, triggered either by innate or acquired distastes227 and Rozin is 
careful to distinguish it from disgust proper.228 While on the output side the distaste 
and disgust systems might appear similar, sharing the physiological and behavioural 
responses (drooling, wrinkling of the nose etc.), disgust has a much broader range of 
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possible elicitors, all of which, however, are centred around the main protective 
function. 
This function is evident in what Rozin et al. understand as “core disgust”: still 
focused on the oral sphere, but differing from the distaste response in that it is a 
system of rejection of potentially dangerous, offensive or otherwise contaminant 
food.229 Unlike in the case of distaste, the disgusting food need not have negative 
sensory properties.230 The prospect of the food having been contaminated in some 
way, particularly by contact with body waste and animals, is enough to make it 
disgusting.231 The focus on the oral sphere is due to the mouth's role as one of the 
primary points of entry into the body, and concerns primarily things that could be 
ingested and incorporated into the self through the mouth and prove to be poisonous 
or otherwise contaminant.  
Apart from certain foods, disgust elicitors include body products, 
inappropriate sexual acts (such as incest or bestiality), body-envelope violations 
(such as deformity), poor hygiene and contact with death.232 As these are all potential 
sources or routes of infection and contamination, “core disgust” is  expanded to 
include the whole of the body and it becomes a defence mechanism for parts of it 
other than the mouth: the nose, the skin, the eyes, that is the outlying extremities 
which serve as entry-points through which the transgression of the body's boundaries 
and the violation of its margins can take place.  
Crucially, among the most powerful disgust elicitors are animals and their 
products. Based on their research using questionnaires and interviews Rozin and 
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Fallon firmly claim in their 1987 paper “A Perspective on Disgust” that “almost all 
objects that qualify as disgusting by our criteria are animals or parts of animals, 
animal body products, or objects that have had contact with any of the above or that 
resemble them.”233 It is so mainly because animals are, or are perceived to be, 
potential sources of infection, as many kinds of them come in contact with feces, 
rotting flesh or other waste.234 Correlate to disgust with animals is  disgust with 
“crawling and swarming part full of (repulsive) excess of life”235 identified by Aurel 
Kolnai as early as 1929.  
The food rejection aspect of disgust puts the omnivorous homo sapiens in a 
precarious position referred to as the “omnivore's dilemma”: on the one hand it is 
beneficial to try new foods,  yet on the other hand such exploration is either 
unpleasant or dangerous. Similarly, animal based foods are the most valuable  in 
terms of nutrition, yet at the same time are among the most disgusting.236 The logic 
and dynamics of disgust is thus a logic and dynamics of paradoxical tension in which 
choices have to be made and trade-offs have to happen. The “omnivore's dilemma” is 
clearly similar to what now could be called “the explorer's dilemma”, and to what 
forms the crux of science fiction: the tension between the threatening and the 
fascinating.  
More interestingly, however, this second-level disgust is symbolically 
extended to respond “to any evidence that our bodies are no different than animal 
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bodies.”237 Anything which reminds humans of their essential animal-nature, “our 
animal vulnerability”238 to injury and death, of our being not unique after all, not 
elevated above animals, is considered disgusting and has to be suppressed. The 
animal-origin disgust serves to “keep human animalness out of awareness.”239  This 
involves the regulation of physiological activities such as excretion, eating and 
having sex, but also the maintenance of grooming and hygiene standards. While 
particular rules differ significantly between cultures, the failure to obey them elicits 
disgust and places the offender below the status of a human. At this stage, by 
denying similarity with animals, this form of disgust becomes not only the guardian 
of the “human soul,”240 or of the human conviction of their superiority over nature, 
but also of normative behavioural systems.  
The effect is the moralisation of disgust. Moral disgust often does not include 
a corporeal element at all. While sometimes it is triggered by the images of the abuse 
or violation of the body, often the elicitors are purely ideational, contextual, 
violations of purity, sacredness, fairness,  or justice 241: 
In these cases a person disrespects the sacredness of God, or causes 
impurity or degradation to himself/herself, or to others. To decide 
if an action is wrong, you think about things like sin, the natural 
order of things, sanctity, and the protection of the soul or the world 
from degradation and spiritual defilement.242 
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 Research shows that  violations of fairness actually activate the same parts of the 
brain that are activated by “core disgust,”243 that is, when people refer to an idea as 
being disgusting they are not being merely metaphorical but are describing a genuine 
physiological reaction. This confirms  the link between trangressive marginal bodily 
experience and ideational systems pointed out by the structural anthropologist Mary 
Douglas: 
all margins are dangerous. If they are pulled this way or that the 
shape of fundamental experience is altered. Any structure of ideas 
is vulnerable at its margins. We should expect the orifices of the 
body to symbolise its specially vulnerable points. Matter issuing 
from them is marginal stuff of the most obvious kind. Spittle, 
blood, milk, urine, faeces or tears by simply issuing forth have 
traversed the boundary of the body. So also have bodily parings, 
skin, nail, hair clippings and sweat. The mistake is to treat bodily 
margins in isolation from all other margins. There is no reason to 
assume any primacy for the individual’s attitude to his own bodily 
and emotional experience, any more than for his cultural and social 
experience.244   
Rozin’s et al. description of moral disgust also confirms the conclusions Douglas 
drew from her analysis of Leviticus that “[h]oliness is exemplified by completeness. 
Holiness requires that individuals shall conform to the class to which they belong. 
And holiness requires that different classes of things shall not be confused.”245 
Whatever violates the boundaries of categorisation becomes impure and disgusting: 
“[h]ybrids and other confusions become abominated.”246 
There is an interesting reciprocality of moralization emergent: acts that are 
morally impermissible are considered disgusting, but also behaviours or individuals 
which are considered disgusting become morally unacceptable. As William Ian 
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Miller observes, commenting on Darwin's example of the man with soup in his 
beard: 
The soup on the beard reveals the man as already contaminated by 
a character defect, a moral failure in keeping himself presentable in 
accordance with the righteously presented demand that he maintain 
his public purity and cleanliness of person and not endanger us by 
his incompetence. It needn't have been soup or bread crumbs that 
incriminated him; it could just as well have been bits of lint or even 
soap residue. No doubt, however, the soup would be more 
disgusting than either lint or soap. The soup, after all, unlike lint or 
soap, might have fallen onto his beard from his mouth or from a 
spoon that had already been in his mouth. It is thus not our fear of 
oral incorporation that makes the soup disgusting to us but his 
failure to have properly orally incorporated it.247 
While the particular elicitors of this kind of disgust will certainly be culturally 
defined and thus will vary considerably between cultures,  moral disgust responses 
will serve to strengthen and protect the cultural and moral systems themselves. 
Rather than being merely a food rejection mechanism, disgust assumes the role of a 
socio-cultural system of exclusion. 
There are two observations which bear directly on the relevance of this  
precession from “oral to moral”  to the analysis of the science fiction nova. Firstly, in 
fits of what Rozin terms “benign masochism,”248  disgust elicitors are sometimes 
actively sought out and when perceived in contexts that are considered safe, where 
there is little to no risk of contamination, often become sources of amusement or 
humour.249 Other negative emotions, such as fear and sadness, and their elicitors, are 
also sought. Rozin attributes this tendency to the experience of pleasure derived from 
suppressing the bodily response, proving that the mind does indeed rule over the 
body and is able to overcome or suppress its reactions to disagreeable stimuli.250 
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Secondly, since disgust plays an important role in moralization and the 
establishment and enforcement of cultural norms and taboos across a very broad 
spectrum, its role of the ultimate anti-transgression emotion should now become 
clear. And since science fiction nova are radically non-normative, it is reasonable to 
expect them to be disgusting. This in turn allows for the dual character of the novum 
identified by Csicsery-Ronay Jr. to emerge: like objects of disgust the nova are 
simultaneously repulsive and attractive, and just like the objects of disgust they are 
simultaneously intensely physical while being ethically and morally charged. These 
inherent dualities make the nova avoid categorisation, which in turn reinforces their 
disgustedness thus closing the feedback loop of disgust.  
There is also a certain parallelism between how the object of disgust is 
always in the centre of immediate attention, and how the novum, because of its 
strangeness and difference, demands and draws attention, too. For Colin McGinn, 
[d]isgust is, importantly, both an aversive and an attractive 
emotion. It repels us from its object, and this is surely its primary 
character, but it can also draw us to that object. The attraction can 
take various forms, and the combination of attraction with 
repulsion can be complex and subtle. […] Death and feces have 
their fascination for the human psyche, in the teeth of their 
repugnance - as do disease, injury, deformity, and other disgust-
inducing conditions. Here is where the notion of “morbid 
fascination” comes in – unhealthy curiosity, sticking your nose 
where it doesn’t belong. People find themselves mesmerized by the 
dead body, drawn to it against their will, even as their stomach 
turns queasy. The bloody car accident invites the prolonged stare, 
along with the heaving of the innards. Even a pile of dung, human 
or animal, carries its quantum of fascination – so intimate, so 
elemental, so curiously assertive. We have to stop and look – a 
momentary sniff might even be indicated. Then we turn abruptly 
away – only to turn back after a calming interval. The disgusting 
exerts its demonic pull, even as it thrusts us away. We feel 
conflicted, confused, and disturbed. [...] There is, after all, 
something exciting about the disgusting, something beyond the 
humdrum: the disgusting is stirring, vital. Disgust sticks in the 
memory and vivifies the senses, even when – especially when – it 
is deemed most repellent. Disgust is not boring. It has a kind of 
negative glamour. [...] And the human psyche is drawn to the 
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interesting and exceptional – the charged object, with its magical 
potency. We are stunned at our capacity to be convulsed by the 
disgusting object; we marvel at its strange power. All this is 
compatible with feelings of intense revulsion.251  
This paradoxical character of disgust makes it a very effective means of both evoking 
estrangement and stimulating cognition to the point that the relation between 
disgusting physicality, negative moral evaluation and the insistent drawing of 
attention to the novum in order to centralise it and thus ensuring that it is the object 
of mental experimentation can be identified as a permanent feature of science fiction. 
Virtually all types and sub-types of science fiction narratives, from alien-invasion 
stories and space-operas to cyberpunk and techno-thrillers rely on it for representing 
their respective nova. 
 
The Estranging Disgustedness of the Alien 
 
Among alien-contact narratives, perhaps none is as iconic and well-known as H.G. 
Well's The War of the Worlds. The physical description of the Martian invaders 
leaves little doubt as to how their alienness is rendered: 
I think everyone expected to see a man emerge – possibly 
something a little unlike us terrestrial men, but in all essentials a 
man. I know I did. But, looking, I presently saw something stirring 
within the shadow: greyish billowy movements, one above another, 
and then two luminous disks – like eyes. Then something 
resembling a little grey snake, about the thickness of a walking 
stick, coiled up out of the writhing middle, and wriggled in the air 
towards me – and then another. A sudden chill came over 
me. […] A big greyish rounded bulk, the size, perhaps, of a bear, 
was rising slowly and painfully out of the cylinder. As it bulged up 
and caught the light, it glistened like wet leather. Two large dark-
coloured eyes were regarding me steadfastly. The mass that framed 
them, the head of the thing, was rounded, and had, one might say, a 
face. There was a mouth under the eyes, the lipless brim of which 
quivered and panted, and dropped saliva. The whole creature 
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heaved and pulsated convulsively. A lank tentacular appendage 
gripped the edge of the cylinder, another swayed in the air. 
Those who have never seen a living Martian can scarcely imagine 
the strange horror of its appearance. The peculiar V-shaped mouth 
with its pointed upper lip, the absence of brow ridges, the absence 
of a chin beneath the wedgelike lower lip, the incessant quivering 
of this mouth, the Gorgon groups of tentacles, the tumultuous 
breathing of the lungs in a strange atmosphere, the evident 
heaviness and painfulness of movement due to the greater 
gravitational energy of the earth – above all, the extraordinary 
intensity of the immense eyes – were at once vital, intense, 
inhuman, crippled and monstrous. 
There was something fungoid in the oily brown skin, something in 
the clumsy deliberation of the tedious movements unspeakably 
nasty. Even at this first encounter, this first glimpse, I was 
overcome with disgust and dread.252  
The Martian engages the whole spectrum of physiological disgust: it clearly secretes 
something through its skin, which, additionally is covered with something fungoid – 
a possible source of infection. It is betentacled, its face is at most tentatively 
recognisable, the shape of the eyes and mouth, the two critically important marginal 
areas, is wrong, even its breathing is different: these elements all violate the body-
envelope dimension of disgust. The only way for the Narrator to describe it is by 
animal oriented similes. At the same time, however, the Martian is “vital and 
intense,” it is the excess of the organic, an overbearing physical presence which is 
not only novel but incomprehensible and unrecognisable. The physical repugnance of 
Martians is paralleled by their efficient and comprehensive cruelty against humans. 
With all of their intensity, the Martians violate and up-turn all categories of order at 
all levels, from the personal breakdown of the Narrator towards the end of the story, 
through the invasion and transformation of the countryside to the effective collapse 
of the British Empire with its political and cultural systems.  
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The Martians themselves fall prey to contamination, as the end of their 
invasion is caused by germs. The Martians are: 
slain by the putrefactive and disease bacteria against which their 
systems were unprepared; slain as the red weed was being slain; 
slain, after all man's devices had failed, by the humblest things that 
God, in his wisdom, has put upon this earth.  there are no bacteria 
in Mars, and directly these invaders arrived, directly they drank and 
fed, our microscopic allies began to work their overthrow. Already 
when I watched them they were irrevocably doomed, dying and 
rotting even as they went to and fro. It was inevitable.253 
The story resolves its conflict through what amounts to food poisoning, a body-
envelope violation brought about by insufficient discrimination in food selection, the 
very basis of all disgust. Through this, the novel is able to deliver its politically and 
socially charged message that while “humans are threatened by aliens embodying the 
technological power and ruthlessness of a future race,” that race is “a race 
representing man's intelligence dehumanized.”254 
Alien invasion narratives appear to be particularly prone to this kind of 
politicising and moralising. In Robert Heinlein's 1951 The Puppet Masters, the 
physical appearance of the alien invaders, the Masters, is also repulsive. They are 
“[g]rayish, faintly translucent, and shot through with darker structure, shapeless - it 
reminded me of a giant clot of frogs' eggs. It was clearly alive, for it pulsed and 
quivered and moved by flowing.”255 The Masters are parasites, attaching themselves 
to human hosts and taking over control of their bodies and minds. The body 
boundary violation is accompanied by the violation of human autonomy, 
individuality and the principle of self-determination.  
In Jack Finney's 1955 novel The Body Snatchers the aliens are plant-like 
seed-pods which replace people with physical duplicates, destroying the originals. 
                                                          
253 Wells, The War of the Worlds. 
254 Kenneth V. Bailey, “Aliens for the Alienated,” in: Storm Warnings. Science Fiction onfronts the 
Future, ed. George Slusser (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), p. 205. 
255 Robert A. Heinlein, The Puppet Masters (New York: Ballantine Books, 1986 [1951]), p. 18. 
106 
 
Ideationally, the aliens threaten to eliminate human emotions: hope, excitement, 
ambition, love. Much like the Masters of Heinlein's novel, they offer to bring 
humanity peace at the price of the ability to experience emotion, and are rejected on 
much the same grounds: the surrender of the ability to experience emotion is a 
fundamental violation of what decides the uniqueness of mankind. The emotions the 
aliens promise to eradicate are precisely those which distinguish man from animals. 
Giving them up would be a debasing, animalising act, and the perspective of it 
causes an immediate rejection reaction.  
And yet, despite the heavy moral and political charging of the invasion-
narratives, their aliens have the potential to elude easy politicisation. According to 
Carl Malmgren it is possible to distinguish between extrapolative and speculative 
science fiction. Speculation involves a “quantum leap of imagination toward an other 
state of affairs.”256 A speculatively generated alien, because of its strangeness, is 
“unknowable”257 and due to this 
transgresses basic characterological norms [...] These alien actants 
explore the limitations of being human and suggest the possibility 
of transcending those limits. They examine what we are not, in so 
doing intimating what we could become. Any attempt to naturalize 
them, to humanize them, fails, since they encode a degree of 
excess, an "essential strangeness," that cannot finally be mastered. 
The speculative encounter resists readerly recuperation; it presents 
itself as an experience to be undergone, not a lesson to be 
learned.258    
Such inexplicability is the defining feature of the alien visitors in Arkady and Boris 
Strugatskys’ Roadside Picnic. The aliens themselves never appear in the novel, the 
only sign of their presence are the contaminated, closed off, paraspatial Visitation 
Zones, full of strange and dangerous phenomena. The disgustedness of the aliens is 
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only manifested through the gruesome mutilations of the human stalkers who dare 
enter these Zones, but otherwise at the core of the alien presence lies conspicuous 
absence. This elusiveness opens the speculative alien to all the potentialities of 
interpretation. Unknowability and incomprehensibility manifested through disgust 
invite an intense effort of mental experimentation, thus making the encounter with 
such radical alterity cognitively satisfying even though no clear explanations are 
provided by the novel.  
On the other end of the knowability spectrum, the long-running space opera 
show Star Trek employs the same mechanism for the generation of a different kind 
of aliens. The extraterrestrials which at various points of the show's history assume 
the role of villains are the excessively aggressive Klingons, the greedy and lecherous 
Ferengi and the treacherous Romulans. Emotionally and ethically these are one-
dimensional, easily-read alien figures.  Physically these aliens are decidedly 
humanoid, visually distinct from humans only through their modified facial features: 
pointy or oversized ears or teeth, extra brow ridges, cranial protrusions and similar 
prosthetic applications. Their anthropomorphism translates almost directly into their 
conceptual transparency, which in turn renders them much more cognitively 
approachable. In Malmgren's terms, aliens of such type are extrapolative, that is 
generated through “logical projection or extension of existing actualities.”259 Thus, 
the strangeness of anthropomorphic aliens is particularised. They are “mirrors” 
which offer “a way to examine our problems in a different light,”260 which in terms 
open the possibility of highly concrete and contextualised cognitive experimentation.
 Non-hostile or outright friendly aliens are not exempt from the disgust 
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principle. In the original run of Star Trek, the science officer Mr Spock (a human-
Vulcan hybrid, with vaguely Mephistophelian features, pointy ears and, apparently, 
green blood) and his coldly logical approach to problems and conflicts are contrasted 
with the more heartfelt and passionate responses of the chief medical officer, Dr 
McCoy, a pure human. McCoy's indignation at Spock's lack of emotion manifests 
itself through what amounts to almost casual racism. He frequently refers to his 
colleague as a “green-blooded son-of-a-bitch” and variations thereof (including 
“green-blooded half-breed,” and “freak”) linking Spock's physicality with him being 
“cold-blooded” and “inhuman.” 
Benign alienness is problematic. As John Huntington noted: „In imaginative 
literature, the phrase “friendly alien” becomes an oxymoron: the imagined friendly 
alien achieves its benignity by approaching the familiar and conventionally valued, 
that is, by not being truly alien. Such alienness is a superficial costume hiding a 
familiar personality.”261 The more recognisable, and hence the more acceptable, the 
alien is, the less alien it becomes. Yet, in order for science fiction to remain what it 
is, a sort of “conservation of alienness” has to take place. As Huntington puts it: 
”One alien can be accepted as benign only by discovering another creature which can 
absorb the xenophobic charge.”262 As this is realised through disgust-based rejection, 
the benignity of the alien must be balanced by the presence of an object which 
becomes the focus of physical or moral violation. 
Huntington uses the example of E.T. The Extraterrestrial to illustrate the 
point. In the initial stages of the encounter the alien is misidentified as “an iguana” or 
“a pervert or a deformed kid or something,” that is the human characters attempt to 
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approach it cognitively in terms of categories of disgust elicitors: animals, moral 
infractions and bodily deformations.  However, “as the alien gains our sympathy (by 
behaving in recognizably human ways), hostility is generated against such adult 
authorities as scientists and policemen,”263 representing the highly normative systems 
which attempt to interfere with the characters doing what they understand to be 
morally right: saving the alien from the prospect of being physically violated by 
human scientists and restoring the order of things by returning E.T. where he 
belongs. 
 In the  Alien film series, the Xenomorph is as physically disgusting and 
violating as possible: it oozes slime, bleeds acid, its reproductive cycle requires the 
presence of an orally penetrated host in which an embryo is deposited. The adult 
alien is hybridical as its DNA merges with that of the host. The birth of the 
Xenomorph is always fatal to the host, and the creature's entire life cycle consists of 
capturing more hosts and depositing more embryos. The graphic imagery of the films 
underscores the creature's physical transgresiveness as the human characters are 
repeatedly torn to pieces, impaled and impregnated by what amounts to being a 
nearly unstoppable, extremely invasive alien life form. Notably however, the 
Xenomorph, with all of its violations of the physical, does not violate any moral 
system, possibly because it does not have one of its own. It is clearly the antagonistic 
element of the films, yet it is not a villain. Instead, the “xenophobic charge” is, at 
least partly, shifted onto the Weyland-Yutani Corporation.  
There emerges an interesting symmetry of disgust between the physically 
disgusting alien which is devoid of any motivational, value or moral systems other 
than the drive to survive and the company which stands behind all the tribulations 
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that befall the crews of the Nostromo and the Sulaco, perfectly willing to sabotage 
and sacrifice its employees, to expose them to infestation by an alien species in the 
name of profit and greed. Moral categorisations do not apply to the Alien, which 
allows the company's representative, the category-violating android Ash (itself made 
disgusting by the gushing of a sickly white fluid accompanying its demise) to admire 
its purity even though physically the Alien is anything but pure. The shifting of 
disgust is so effective as to lead Ripley to admit: “I don't know which species is 
worse. You don't see them fucking each other over for a goddamn percentage.”264 
 
Disgusting Technologies 
 
The reliance on disgust in creating estrangement and, consequently, stimulating 
cognitive exploration through mental experimentation is also clearly visible in 
science fictional representations of technology. The logic operating here is almost 
exactly like the one inherent in the omnivore's dillemma, where the enthusiasm for 
potential benefits is mitigated by the awareness of the possible threats and regulated 
through the experience of disgust. The ambivalent emotional attitude towards 
technology, one of simultaneous fascination and terrified revulsion, present in so 
much of science fiction, closely parallels the ambivalent attitude towards the 
disgusting.  Just as the disgusting is a violator, something out of its place, 
challenging and threatening the ordered structures,  so is technology, which 
according to Walter McDougall is “always disruptive and creates a crisis for 
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culture.”265 The philosopher Carl Mitcham considers the problem of the “modern 
technological project” in terms of “uneasiness” which has been  
nourished [...] by the common experience of citizens of 
technological societies over the past four decades – as all of us 
have been forced in divisive circumstances to address ethical issues 
associated with nuclear weapons  and power plants, developments 
in information technologies from telegraphs to computers, 
biomedical technologies, space exploration, technological disasters 
and environmental pollution. Emerging from human thought, they 
also challenge it, as becomes apparent almost immediately.266 
 
Paradoxically, all the challenges, subversions and disruptions form a continuity. As 
Scott Bukatman noted in his Terminal Identity, following the technological and 
cultural periodizations of Ernest Mandel and Fredric Jameson, it is possible to 
establish a rough chronology of emergence of new technologies, from the advent of 
the Machine Age, through the Nuclear and Space Ages, to the Information Age, each 
epoch accompanied by a corresponding set of fears and anxieties, accumulating 
rather than superseding one another: “Nuclear anxieties continue to proliferate, while 
worries about the Machine are hardly obsolete for large parts of the population. 
Under postmodernity, these techno-anxieties commingle.”267    
Science fiction narrates this sense of uneasiness and disruption in a way 
which is itself disruptive, using fictional derivatives of the real-life technological 
changes in the form of postulated inventions, discoveries or developments, which, 
while always somehow related to the real-life phenomena, are at the same time 
placed outside, or beyond, the established scientific paradigms. Thus, the science 
fiction novum itself is always placed in the position of offending violation, of 
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challenging the margins of science and technology which themselves challenge the 
protective envelope of the established cultural systems.  
The fundamental continuity of science fiction’s focus on technology-related 
crises is reflected in the continuity of the presence of disgust. William Gibson’s short 
story “The Gernsback Continuum,” a radical literary manifesto, announcing a shift 
from the optimistic and enthusiastic style of science fiction emblematic of the “pulp 
era,” towards a more gritty, visceral and even cynical attitude of cyberpunk, 
highlights the presence of this continuity. Gibson’s endeavour to create a new style 
of science fiction writing arises, as he admitted in an interview with Larry 
McCaffery, from “an aesthetic revulsion”268 towards the old paradigm. Gibson said 
that he “had a sense of what the expectations of the SF industry were in terms of 
product, but [he] hated that product and felt such a genuine sense of disgust that [he] 
consciously decided to reverse expectations, not give publishers or readers what they 
wanted”269 and that sense of disgust is reflected in the short story. 
The old, Gernsbackian, paradigm of science fiction is represented in the story 
by the “semiotic ghosts” of the past imaginings of the future (which is the 
protagonist’s present). These retro-future visions which invade the protagonist’s 
reality are imposing and impressive, determined and intensely vital, and yet, the 
language Gibson uses to evaluate them is strikingly repulsive. When experiencing a 
vision of a futuristic city in which: 
Spire stood on spire in gleaming ziggurat steps that climbed to a 
central golden temple tower ringed with the crazy radiator flanges 
of the Mongo gas stations. You could hide the Empire State 
Building in the smallest of those towers. Roads of crystal soared 
between the spires, crossed and recrossed by smooth silver shapes 
like beads of running mercury. The air was thick with ships: giant 
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wing-liners, little darting silver things (sometimes one of the 
quicksilver shapes from the sky bridges rose gracefully into the air 
and flew up to join the dance), mile-long blimps, hovering 
dragonfly things that were gyrocopters...270 
the protagonist immediately off-sets the poetic description by the realisation that the 
city was “a dream […] thrown up out of the collective yearning of an era.”271 
 The city’s inhabitants are portrayed through a similar juxtaposition of 
physical attractiveness and an underlying repulsiveness: 
They frightened me. 
They were white, blond, and they probably had blue eyes. They 
were American. Dialta had said that the Future had come to 
America first, but had finally passed it by. But not here, in the heart 
of the Dream. Here, we'd gone on and on, in a dream logic that 
knew nothing of pollution, the finite bounds of fossil fuel, or 
foreign wars it was possible to lose. They were smug, happy, and 
utterly content with themselves and their world. And in the Dream, 
it was their world. I imagined them thronging the plazas of white 
marble, orderly and alert, their bright eyes shining with enthusiasm 
for their floodlit avenues and silver cars. It had all the sinister 
fruitiness of Hitler Youth propaganda.272 
What the story offers as a solution to the contaminative invasiveness of the retro-
future visions is a total submersion in the cultural reality of the present. The character 
of that reality is, however, equally negative. The protagonist is told to “[w]atch lots 
of television, particularly game shows and soaps. Go to porn movies. Ever see Nazi 
Love Motel? They've got it on cable, here. Really awful. Just what you need. Really 
bad media can exorcise your semiotic ghosts.”273 The sleaziness and shallowness of 
electronic media, “the hard evidence of the human near-dystopia we live in” is 
conveyed through a sexual reference to Nazis, parallel to the negative evaluation of 
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the old aesthetic and literary paradigm. This parallelism testifies to the postulated 
continuity of the presence of disgust and its function as the vector of estrangement. 
Cyberpunk aesthetics which Gibson’s writings did so much to establish 
showcases how the techno-anxieties are negotiated through disgust. This is 
particularly visible in the attitude towards the human body. Firstly, though ostensibly 
interested in immaterial, dislocated digital technologies, cyberpunk insistently and 
explicitly draws attention to the bodily. According to Dani Cavallaro “[cy]berculture 
pivots on a contradiction: a growing fascination with the body, testified by all sorts 
of media, coexists with an increasing infiltration of the body by technologies that 
seem to take its materiality away.”274 The underlying desire for the removal of the 
materiality of the body and the transcendence of its physical limitations is a direct 
mirroring of the animal-nature focus of disgust.  
The cyberpunk body can only transcend itself when exposed to violations of 
its integrity, or as Cavallaro puts it, when “technology penetrates the body and its 
frail dermal casing.”275 For Scott Bukatman, within the discourse of cyberpunk  
the body is hardly inviolate – it is instead a site of almost endless 
dissolution. From here the language of terminal identity becomes 
increasingly de-forming of the human, as the subject is simulated, 
morphed, modified, retooled, genetically engineered, and even 
dissolved.276 
Bodily modification, mutilation, interfacing with technology and techno-biological 
hybridity which constitute so much of cyberpunk imagery, belong to the category of 
body envelope violations which are one of the primary sources of disgust, and the 
category-violating potential of these modifications, the dissolution of the distinction 
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between the human and the technological violates the principles of purity which lie at 
the core of moral disgust responses. 
The principle holds true also for those texts which overtly define themselves 
by the embracement of the speculated future changes, rather  than by anxiety. Paul 
Di Fillipo’s “Ribofunk: The Manifesto” argues that both cybernetics and punk music 
were dead by the time cyberpunk fiction was created, and thus ribofunk (from 
“ribosome” and “funk”) “acknowledges, is informed by and illustrates the tenet that 
the next revolution – the only one that really matters – will be in the field of 
biology.”277 In opposing cyberpunk and in embracing the biotechnological revolution 
Di Fillippo’s argument employs language effectively centred on a set of bodily 
references similar to those which establish the disgustedness of cyberpunk alterity. 
He argues that 
Ribofunk must be as sensual as sex, as unsparing in sweat, cum, 
bile and lymph as the the body is prolific in these substances. 
Moreover, it must possess the same blind imperatives as the body. 
Crushed and crippled, the body persists, while many times the 
mind succumbs. We have gone as far as intellectuality can take us. 
We need a fiction as urgent as hunger or a hard-on. Hot, not 
cool.278 
In the Ribofunk short story collection, a follow-up to his manifesto, Di Fillippo 
presents an array of possible applications of the biotechnological revolution. While 
the general attitude of the short stories is enthusiastic and even frivolous, all the 
bodily modifications present in the collection are disgust elicitors: from core disgust 
evoked by skin and bone structure modifications, glandular implants secreting 
hormones and pheromones to moral disgust accompanying the creation of category 
violating human-animal hybrids and their sexual exploitation.279 
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 Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Radio considers the possibility of spontaneous human 
speciation and the social and cultural challenges such an event would cause. The 
speciation is caused by a retrovirus (SHEVA) which causes a pregnant woman 
infected with it to conceive and then miscarry a severely malformed fetus which 
leaves behind a fertilized egg. The embryo has fifty-two chromosomes and is a new 
subspecies of the homo sapiens, a homo sapiens novus, in many ways superior to the 
old form. It is of note that while the new human subspecies is an upgrade to the old, 
its appearance is considered by Bear in terms of a disease or an epidemic. The 
transformation of the genetic code threatens the existence of the established cultural 
codes. This threat is foregrounded by the monstrous character of the fertilisation 
process in which the malformation of the intermediary fetus is intensely disgusting:   
The head is severely malformed. The brain is just a nubbin of tissue 
at the end of a shortened spinal cord. There is no jaw. The eye 
sockets are open at the side, like a kitten's. The skull looks more 
like a lemur's, what there is of it. No brain function would have 
been possible after the first three weeks. No metabolism could have 
been established after the first month. This thing functions as an 
organ drawing sustenance, but it has no kidneys, a very small liver, 
no stomach or intestines to speak of... A kind of heart, but again, 
very small. The limbs are just little fleshy buttons. It's not much 
more than an ovary with a blood supply.280 
The viscerality of the description is particularly striking given that the evolved 
humans are portrayed in prevailingly positive terms. That their newness and alterity 
have to be conveyed through such imagery testifies to disgust’s central role in 
creating estrangement. 
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Conclusion 
 
What the preceding discussion illustrates is how an evolved, originally physiological, 
mechanism plays a role in shaping a cultural phenomenon. Disgust seems to be a 
primary means of creating estrangement in science fiction. It plays a crucial role in 
creating physical and ideational alienness of science fictional nova and because of its 
connection to moralisation allows for a wide range of cognitive and emotional 
interactions with them. The experience of disgust is transgressive, marginal, and 
threatening at the same time and these characteristics correlate with the character of 
science fictional otherness. However, because objects of disgust are, at the same 
time, intensely fascinating, otherness also becomes attractive. This, in turn, ensures 
interest and thus enables science fiction to perform its function of mental 
experimentation. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
“The bough swings in the wind,        
the night is deep;   
Look at the stars, poor little ape, 
and sleep.” 
That one almost made me whoop - what 
monkeys we are, I thought.  
Fritz Leiber, Big Time 
 
The study of literature from a Darwinian perspective necessitates a number of 
paradigmatic and methodological shifts. In terms of paradigmatic reorientation, 
literary Darwinism entails a focus on the functional relations of literature to 
evolutionary notions such as adaptiveness or fitness. As these operate mostly on the 
scale of entire populations, and at a level of high generality, Darwinian Literary 
Studies turn away from the discourse-oriented post-structuralist paradigm of 
multiple, local narratives, focusing instead on the common heritage and shared 
evolutionary experiences of mankind. Granted, literary, or otherwise artistic, 
creations of different human cultures will significantly differ from one another, and 
yet, in this view, they will all operate in relation to the same basic needs or problems. 
Thus, the Darwinian paradigm focuses on the essential unity of mankind and its past 
and present experiences, rather than on its fragmentation. As Kwame Anthony 
Appiah puts it, artistic activity provides a connecting factor for all humans “not 
through identity, but despite difference. We can respond to art that is not ours; […] 
My people – human beings – made the Great Wall of China, the Sistine Chapel, the 
Chrysler Building: these things were made by creatures like me, through the exercise 
of skill and imagination.”281 
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The paradigmatic refocus enforces a methodological shift, in which the object 
of research becomes the search for mechanisms responsible for conditioning the way 
in which literary works are structured and organised, as well as the links between 
these works and the adaptive needs in response to which they arise. Since Freudian 
or Lacanian psychologies, prevalent in theoretical studies despite their relatively 
marginal significance in contemporary psychology, either ignore or are outright at 
odds with the evolutionary approach, DLS turns towards both more mainstream 
psychology, which often includes an evolutionary component, and the less 
established evolutionary psychology.  
These changes in focus, obviously, put Darwinian Literary Studies at odds 
with the preferred methodologies of much of literary theory, as evidenced by the 
highly militant tone of some if its programmatic manifestos, which certainly does not 
facilitate the wider adoption, or even recognition of DLS.  The situation is 
exacerbated by the fact that while psychoanalytical approaches are fairly well 
established and known within literary theory, the types of psychology preferred by 
DLS are not. This creates a practical obstacle in its wider adoption, namely, the 
necessity to acquire a certain level of familiarity with, if not expertise in, a vast area 
of knowledge that is non-psychoanalytical psychology. 
The presence of these difficulties is unfortunate. With its background in 
biology and intense stress of interdisciplinarity inherent in the idea of scientific 
consilience, DLS is, potentially, a means of bridging the gap between the natural 
sciences and the humanities. As Dominika Oramus concludes, “Darwinism can 
provide the two cultures with a common language, and thus eliminate the illusory 
differences caused by miscommunication. […] It can become a lingua franca of 
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science.”282 The establishment of such a unified science, could open possibilities to 
ask and answer questions previously unaddressed by either of the two great branches. 
This dissertation was written with the hope that incorporating DLS into 
science fiction studies can offer a contribution to the field by resolving some of the 
antagonistic paradoxes outlined earlier. The immediate goal of the study was to 
approach the phenomenon of science fiction from an evolutionarily oriented 
perspective in order to establish what the function and purpose of the genre is and to 
analyse which mechanisms are responsible for shaping the patterns and formulas of 
science fiction’s poetics. The discussion demonstrated that because it stimulates 
mental and cognitive experimentation, fiction in general, and science fiction in 
particular, displays a decisively epistemological orientation. This gives it the 
potential to facilitate learning, increase the cultural depository of available 
knowledge and, by exposing the reader to repeated contacts with intense novelty, 
through the effect of “mere exposure,” enhance the attitude toward the general ideas 
of otherness, alterity and change, thus serving to lessen the possible “future shock.”. 
 Further, it was argued that generation of heterotopic spaces and paraspaces in 
science fiction, and the narrative treatment of these spaces, correlates with the 
evolutionary understanding of how humans approach new environments. Those 
environments which are rich in Mystery and thus appear to offer many opportunities 
for exploration and interaction are considered attractive and are preferred over those 
which appear boring. The accumulation of strangeness and alterity, which is 
characteristic of heterotopias and paraspaces of science fiction, ensures their 
mysteriousness and is conducive to the evocation of interest in these spaces, which 
invites exploration and thus makes mental experimentation possible. Such treatment 
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of fictional spaces can be a form of a cultural reinforcement of the innate exploration 
drive. 
 Finally, the function of disgust as a primary means of evoking estrangement 
in science fiction was discussed. Evidence was presented how disgust plays a role in 
the narrative shaping of embodied and technological aliennes. Because of the 
paradoxical character of this emotion, whose elicitors are at the same time intensely 
repelling and alluring, and because of its link with the process of moralisation, 
disgust guarantees interest in the fictional novelty and opens it to a number of 
possible interactions with, which in turn enable the cognitive experimentation 
described earlier to take place.  
 The evidence presented in the study confirms that science fiction seems to 
possess features which could make it adaptively beneficial and that it is narratively 
and conceptually organised around features and strategies which allow it to culturally 
reinforce adaptive psychological mechanisms. The analysis of these mechanisms 
allows to answer the main research questions and to achieve the  direct goal of the 
study 
 In a wider, less direct, sense, the dissertation serves to testify to the validity of 
the Darwinian approach and its significance to literary theory in general. To be sure, 
there are obstacles to a wider recognition of DLS, some of which are of emotional 
and some of which are of practical nature. In addition, the totalising, large scale 
scope of DLS makes it ill-suited to provide more detailed, reflective analyses of 
literary works. Nor is DLS, perhaps despite the ambitions of some of its most vocal 
proponents, able to constitute itself as a completely independent field of study. It 
necessarily must rely on, and draw from, the conceptual apparatuses already present 
in the more standard types of literary theory. However, with these reservations in 
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mind, the ultimate conclusion appears to be that Darwinian Literary Studies can, 
instead of supplanting, enrich the existing body of literary knowledge. 
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SUMMARY 
 
The object of the study is to approach the phenomenon of science fiction from an 
evolutionarily oriented perspective in order to analyse whether it is possible to assign 
it an adaptive function and to establish links between persistent narrative patterns and 
regularities present in science fiction, and evolved psychological mechanisms present 
in humans, which would validate the central theoretical premise of Darwinian 
Literary Studies.  
Chapter 1 provides a contextual overview of evolutionary attempts at 
analysing human behaviour in terms of it being linked with innate, genetic, 
predispositions. It also introduces Edward O. Wilson’s idea of scientific consilience 
which forms the conceptual basis for the development of Darwinian Literary Studies. 
Chapter 2 introduces the precepts of Darwinian Literary Studies, discusses 
DLS in relation to the dominant literary theoretical paradigm and argues that fiction 
in general and science fiction in particular, because it stimulates mental and cognitive 
experimentation, displays a decisively epistemological orientation. This gives it the 
potential to facilitate learning, particularly in reference to possible future contacts 
with the unknown and the novel. While there is no definite proof of science fiction’s 
adaptive usefulness, this focus on experimentation allows for a tentative claim to be 
made that its cultural presence might be, potentially, fitness-enhancing. 
Chapter 3 argues that generation of heterotopic spaces and paraspaces in 
science fiction and the narrative treatment of these spaces correlates with the 
evolutionary understanding of how humans interact with and approach new 
environments. Those environments which are rich in Mystery and thus appear to 
offer many opportunities for exploration and interaction are considered attractive and 
are preferred over those which appear boring. The accumulation of strangeness and 
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alterity which characterises the heterotopias and paraspaces of science fiction ensures 
their mysteriousness and is conducive to the evocation of interest in these spaces 
which invites exploration and thus makes mental experimentation possible. It is also 
argued that such treatment of fictional spaces can be a form of a cultural 
reinforcement of the innate exploration drive. 
Chapter 4 considers the function of disgust as a primary means of evoking 
estrangement in science fiction. Because of the paradoxical character of this emotion, 
whose elicitors are at the same time intensely repelling and alluring, and because of 
its link with the process of moralisation, disgust guarantees interest in the fictional 
novelty and opens it to a number of possible interactions with. Evidence is presented 
how disgust plays a role in the narrative shaping of embodied and technological 
aliennes. 
The evidence presented in the study appears to confirm its initial hypotheses: 
science fiction is narratively and conceptually organised around innate psychological 
mechanisms and seems to possess features which could make it adaptively beneficial 
and. This, at least partially, testifies to the correctness of the theoretical framework of 
Darwinian Literary Studies. 
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STRESZCZENIE 
 
Celem rozprawy jest analiza fantastyki naukowej z perspektywy 
literaturoznawstwa darwinistycznego w celu ustalenia jakie mechanizmy stoją za 
fabularnymi i narracyjnymi schematami poetyki fantastycznonaukowej; zbadania, 
czy możliwe jest aby fantastyka naukowa pełniła funkcję adaptacyjną, oraz, 
pośrednio, zbadanie użyteczności literaturoznawstwa darwinistycznego jako 
narzędzia analizy teoretycznej.  
Rozdział pierwszy stanowi przegląd dotychczasowych badań skupiających się 
na wpływie uwarunkowań genetycznych i adaptacyjnych na formy i sposoby 
ludzkich zachowań kulturowych oraz przybliża pojęcie konsiliencji wprowadzone 
przez Edwarda O. Wilsona a stanowiące intelektualną podstawę do rozwoju 
ewolucyjnie zorientowanych badań literackich. 
Rozdział drugi przybliża cele i  metodologię literaturoznawstwa 
darwinistycznego, w dużej mierze wyrastającego z opozycji wobec dominujących 
obecnie w Teorii trendów poststrukturalistycznych. Odrzucenie centralnych dla 
postrukturalizmu założeń, pozwala na paradygmatyczną reorientację badań 
literackich, co z kolei otwiera drogę do analizy aktywności artystycznej, w tym także 
literackiej, w relacji do biologicznie motywowanych potrzeb adaptacyjnych. 
Rozdział stanowi próbę wykazania, że fantastyka naukowa, poprzez swoją 
koncentrację na eksperymentach poznawczych, myślowych i intelektualnych 
skupionych na interakcji z nowym, odmiennym i niezwykłym, stanowi ważny 
element w procesie zdobywania niezbędnej wiedzy o świecie, niemożliwej do 
zdobycia inaczej niż poprzez kontakt z fikcyjnymi fabułami. 
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Rozdziały trzeci i czwarty podejmują analizę schematów narracyjnych 
obecnych w fantastyce naukowej. Pierwszy z nich skupia się na heterotopijnym, a 
więc odmiennym i alternatywnym charakterze przestrzeni obecnych w fantastyce 
naukowej. Odmienność ta sprawia, że przestrzenie fantastyki zawsze są 
nieprzewidywalne, potencjalnie groźne i obiecujące równocześnie. Taki charakter 
przestrzeni lub krajobrazu, jak pokazują badania z zakresu psychologii ewolucyjnej, 
jest dla człowieka najatrakcyjniejszy, co w przypadku fantastyki naukowej zapewnia, 
że jej treść będzie dla czytelnika interesująca. To uchwycenie i zapewnienie uwagi 
stanowi zachętę do intelektualnej eksploracji, a ta może odgrywać rolę adaptacyjną. 
Rozdział czwarty pokazuje, że elementem kluczowym dla przedstawienia 
fantastycznonaukowego uniezwyklenia poznawczego (cognitive estrangement) jest 
obecność obrzydzenia. Paradoksalny charakter tego uczucia, wzbudzającego 
równocześnie odrzucenie i fascynację, domagającego się natychmiastowej uwagi i 
reakcji, gwarantuje zainteresowanie czytelnika elementem odmienności i, ponownie, 
otwiera go na szeroką gamę interakcji poznawczych.    
Przedstawione analizy pozwalają odpowiedzieć na postawione w rozprawie 
pytania dotyczące schematyczności fantastyki naukowej,  jej potencjalnych funkcji 
poznawczo-adaptacyjnych oraz pokazują użyteczność literaturoznawstwa 
darwinistycznego. 
 
